{"title":"Population dynamics of welfare stigma: welfare fraud versus incomplete take-up","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s00148-024-01009-8","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>This study investigates the conditions under which welfare fraud and incomplete take-up emerge simultaneously and persist for a long time, which has been observed in many countries, particularly Japan and Germany. To do this, we extend models of statistical discrimination and taxpayers’ resentment to simple models of population dynamics. We find two stable boundary equilibria in the first model. One of these equilibria entails low welfare fraud and <span> <span>\\(100\\%\\)</span> </span> incomplete take-up, and the other entails high welfare fraud and <span> <span>\\(100\\%\\)</span> </span> take-up. In contrast, we find a unique stable equilibrium in the tax resentment model, which is interior and thus allows for the coexistence of welfare fraud and incomplete take-up in a long run. Hence, we conclude that this unique long-run equilibrium of the dynamic taxpayers’ resentment model provides a better explanation for the observation of simultaneous and persistent presence of welfare fraud and incomplete take-up in actual economies.</p>","PeriodicalId":48013,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Population Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Population Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-024-01009-8","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This study investigates the conditions under which welfare fraud and incomplete take-up emerge simultaneously and persist for a long time, which has been observed in many countries, particularly Japan and Germany. To do this, we extend models of statistical discrimination and taxpayers’ resentment to simple models of population dynamics. We find two stable boundary equilibria in the first model. One of these equilibria entails low welfare fraud and \(100\%\) incomplete take-up, and the other entails high welfare fraud and \(100\%\) take-up. In contrast, we find a unique stable equilibrium in the tax resentment model, which is interior and thus allows for the coexistence of welfare fraud and incomplete take-up in a long run. Hence, we conclude that this unique long-run equilibrium of the dynamic taxpayers’ resentment model provides a better explanation for the observation of simultaneous and persistent presence of welfare fraud and incomplete take-up in actual economies.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Population Economics is an international quarterly that publishes original theoretical and applied research in all areas of population economics.
Micro-level topics examine individual, household or family behavior, including household formation, marriage, divorce, fertility choices, education, labor supply, migration, health, risky behavior and aging. Macro-level investigations may address such issues as economic growth with exogenous or endogenous population evolution, population policy, savings and pensions, social security, housing, and health care.
The journal also features research into economic approaches to human biology, the relationship between population dynamics and public choice, and the impact of population on the distribution of income and wealth. Lastly, readers will find papers dealing with policy issues and development problems that are relevant to population issues.The journal is published in collaboration with POP at UNU-MERIT, the Global Labor Organization (GLO) and the European Society for Population Economics (ESPE).Officially cited as: J Popul Econ Factor (RePEc): 13.576 (July 2018) Rank 69 of 2102 journals listed in RePEc
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