Ročište pre odbacivanja tužbe (čl. 294, st. 2 ZPP) – Forma bez smisla ili smisao bez adekvatne forme –

D. Petković
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Abstract

In the legal doctrine and practice of the highest court in the country, there is a prevailing opinion that a hearing before the dismissal of the lawsuit realizes and protects the right to be heard. At the same time, the right to be heard is identified with the principle of adversary (audiatur et altera pars), that is, with the right of one party to respond to the requests, statements and proposals of the opponent party. Also, it is understood that the denial of this hearing represents an absolute substantial procedural defect from Art. 374 (2) point 7 of the Law on Civil Procedure (ZPP). However, at the hearing analysed here, the plaintiff does not respond to the legal argumentation of the opposing side, but to the legal reasoning of the court. This paper critically examines the content of the right to be heard, more precisely, the traditional understanding of this right. As a result of the analysis, the right to be heard is equated with the right to a hearing, which allows parties to respond to the procedural actions undertaken by their opponent (relationship: partyparty), but also to the court’s legal reasoning (relationship: courtparty), during the course of the hearing. Given that these two forms of the right to be heard do not serve to achieve the same goals, an interpretation of Art. 374 (2) point 7 ZPP is offered through teleological reduction. It implies that only denying a party to respond to the opponents’ actions and statements leads to an absolute substantial procedural defect. While, on the other hand, denying a party to express opinion regarding the legal reasoning of the court, represents a relative substantial procedural defect.
消除需要手册(《民事诉讼法》第294条第2款) - Forma bez smisla ili smisao bez adekvatne forme - 《民事诉讼法》第294条第2款。
在国家最高法院的法律理论和实践中,有一种普遍的观点认为,在驳回诉讼之前进行听证是对陈述权的实现和保护。同时,听证权与对抗原则(audiatur et altera pars)相一致,即一方当事人有权对对方当事人的请求、陈述和建议做出回应。此外,根据《民事诉讼法》第 374 条第 2 款第 7 点的规定,拒绝听证绝对是程序上的重大缺陷。民事诉讼法》(ZPP)第 374(2)条第 7 点规定,拒绝举行听证会是绝对的实质性程序缺陷。然而,在本文分析的听证会上,原告并未对对方的法律论证做出回应,而是对法庭的法律推理做出了回应。本文批判性地研究了陈述权的内容,更确切地说,是对这一权利的传统理解。分析的结果是,发表意见权等同于听证权,听证权允许当事人在听证过程中对对方当事人(关系:当事人party)的程序行为以及法院的法律推理(关系:法院party)做出回应。鉴于这两种形式的陈述权并不是为了实现相同的目标,因此对《德国民事诉讼法典》第 374 条第 2 款第 7 点的解释是:"陈述权"(the right to be heard)指的是 "发表意见的权利"。对《民事诉讼法典》第 374 条第 2 款第 7 点的解释是通过目的论还原法提出的。这意味着,只有拒绝一方当事人对对手的行为和声明做出回应才会导致绝对的实质性程序缺陷。另一方面,拒绝一方当事人就法院的法律推理发表意见则是相对的实质性程序缺陷。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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