Procurement cartels and the fight against (outsider) bribing

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-01-01 DOI:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102506

Roberto Burguet , Elisabetta Iossa , Giancarlo Spagnolo

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost of reporting corrupt bureaucrats gives rise to a free riding problem. Cooperation among long-run (honest) firms alleviates free-riding in reporting. However, it also facilitates collusion in bidding by increasing the value of the collusive rent. In turn, bidding collusion facilitates cooperation in reporting by increasing the value of having honest bureaucrats, generating a trade-off between collusion and corruption.

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采购卡特尔和打击（外部）贿赂

我们在一个重复采购的风格化模型中研究了合谋与腐败之间的关系，在该模型中，举报腐败官僚的成本导致了搭便车问题。长期（诚实）企业之间的合作缓解了举报中的搭便车问题。然而，这也会通过增加合谋租金的价值来促进投标中的合谋行为。反过来，投标串通又会通过增加拥有诚实官僚的价值来促进举报合作，从而在串通和腐败之间产生权衡。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

European Journal of Political Economy Multiple-

CiteScore

3.40

自引率

10.00%

发文量

106

期刊介绍： The aim of the European Journal of Political Economy is to disseminate original theoretical and empirical research on economic phenomena within a scope that encompasses collective decision making, political behavior, and the role of institutions. Contributions are invited from the international community of researchers. Manuscripts must be published in English. Starting 2008, the European Journal of Political Economy is indexed in the Social Sciences Citation Index published by Thomson Scientific (formerly ISI).