Competing platform owners’ entry and an OEM's cooperation response

IF 3.1 4区管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT

International Transactions in Operational Research Pub Date : 2024-02-11 DOI:10.1111/itor.13443

Xiangxiang Wu, Yong Zha, Liang Liang

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper develops a game-theoretic model that examines the entry decisions of two competing platform owners with differentiated research and development (R&D) efficiency and the response strategy of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in selecting which platform to cooperate with. The OEM and platform owners compete on quality and price in the face of consumers with heterogeneous preferences across the dimensions of the device and platform. We analyze the interaction between the entry decisions of platform owners and the OEM's response strategy within two cooperation models. In the charging model, we find that in the absence of entry, the OEM prefers the high-efficiency platform. When only one platform owner enters, the OEM prefers the low-efficiency platform. If the differentiated R&D efficiency and the device differentiation cost are large, both platform owners will choose to enter and the OEM will cooperate with the low-efficiency platform. In the bundling model, when only one platform owner enters, only at a large cost of device differentiation will the OEM cooperate with the platform that enters the market to weaken market competition. In particular, when only the high-efficiency platform enters, it is interesting that there exists a large cost of device differentiation that makes the high-efficiency platform more favorable in the case when the OEM cooperates with the low-efficiency platform. Our study provides practical insights into platform entry and OEM response.

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竞争平台所有者的加入和原始设备制造商的合作对策

本文建立了一个博弈论模型，研究了两个具有不同研发效率的竞争平台所有者的进入决策，以及原始设备制造商（OEM）在选择与哪个平台合作时的应对策略。原始设备制造商和平台所有者在质量和价格方面展开竞争，而消费者对设备和平台的偏好各不相同。我们在两个合作模型中分析了平台所有者的进入决策与原始设备制造商的应对策略之间的相互作用。在收费模型中，我们发现在没有进入者的情况下，原始设备制造商更倾向于高效平台。当只有一个平台所有者进入时，原始设备制造商更倾向于低效率平台。如果差异化研发效率和设备差异化成本较大，则两个平台所有者都会选择进入，原始设备制造商会与低效率平台合作。在捆绑模式中，当只有一个平台所有者进入时，只有在设备差异化成本较大时，原始设备制造商才会与进入市场的平台合作，以削弱市场竞争。特别是，当只有高效平台进入时，有趣的是，存在着较大的设备差异化成本，这使得在原始设备制造商与低效平台合作的情况下，高效平台更有利。我们的研究为平台进入和原始设备制造商的应对提供了实用的见解。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

International Transactions in Operational Research OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE-

CiteScore

7.80

自引率

12.90%

发文量

146

审稿时长

>12 weeks

期刊介绍： International Transactions in Operational Research (ITOR) aims to advance the understanding and practice of Operational Research (OR) and Management Science internationally. Its scope includes: International problems, such as those of fisheries management, environmental issues, and global competitiveness International work done by major OR figures Studies of worldwide interest from nations with emerging OR communities National or regional OR work which has the potential for application in other nations Technical developments of international interest Specific organizational examples that can be applied in other countries National and international presentations of transnational interest Broadly relevant professional issues, such as those of ethics and practice Applications relevant to global industries, such as operations management, manufacturing, and logistics.