{"title":"Aristotelian Flourishing and Contemporary Philosophical Theories of Wellbeing","authors":"","doi":"10.1007/s10902-024-00723-0","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<h3>Abstract</h3> <p>Several philosophical theories of wellbeing claim Aristotelian ancestry and employ an Aristotelian construct of flourishing. Yet it is not clear how we should interpret Aristotle’s notion of flourishing or eudaimonia (εὐδαιμονία). In this article, we offer an analysis of Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia and consider to what extent it can be categorized within the framework of contemporary philosophical theories of wellbeing. We stress the active character of Aristotelian flourishing and its focus on the development of living things over time, which contrasts with the static and passive character of contemporary philosophical accounts of wellbeing. We suggest that Aristotle is closest to a perfectionist theory of wellbeing, though even this requires some qualification. While rational activity in accord with virtue is central to Aristotle’s account of living well, Aristotle also states that a range of practical human activities and propitious life circumstances are necessary (and, on some interpretations, constitutive) features of the flourishing life. As such, Aristotelian flourishing includes elements of moral and cognitive perfectionism as well as an objective list of external goods and presupposes one’s embeddedness within communities. We close with a consideration of the implications of our argument for the philosophical and social scientific study of flourishing. Contemporary well-being philosophers should be mindful of ways in which Aristotelian eudaimonia extends beyond the dominant philosophical categories of wellbeing that have a static focus and concern themselves with subjective experience or the possession of objective goods. Social scientists should be transparent about the limits of invoking an Aristotelian pedigree to motivate their own theories of wellbeing and should understand the implications of more limited conceptions.</p>","PeriodicalId":15837,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Happiness Studies","volume":"296 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Happiness Studies","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10902-024-00723-0","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"PSYCHOLOGY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Several philosophical theories of wellbeing claim Aristotelian ancestry and employ an Aristotelian construct of flourishing. Yet it is not clear how we should interpret Aristotle’s notion of flourishing or eudaimonia (εὐδαιμονία). In this article, we offer an analysis of Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia and consider to what extent it can be categorized within the framework of contemporary philosophical theories of wellbeing. We stress the active character of Aristotelian flourishing and its focus on the development of living things over time, which contrasts with the static and passive character of contemporary philosophical accounts of wellbeing. We suggest that Aristotle is closest to a perfectionist theory of wellbeing, though even this requires some qualification. While rational activity in accord with virtue is central to Aristotle’s account of living well, Aristotle also states that a range of practical human activities and propitious life circumstances are necessary (and, on some interpretations, constitutive) features of the flourishing life. As such, Aristotelian flourishing includes elements of moral and cognitive perfectionism as well as an objective list of external goods and presupposes one’s embeddedness within communities. We close with a consideration of the implications of our argument for the philosophical and social scientific study of flourishing. Contemporary well-being philosophers should be mindful of ways in which Aristotelian eudaimonia extends beyond the dominant philosophical categories of wellbeing that have a static focus and concern themselves with subjective experience or the possession of objective goods. Social scientists should be transparent about the limits of invoking an Aristotelian pedigree to motivate their own theories of wellbeing and should understand the implications of more limited conceptions.
期刊介绍：
The international peer-reviewed Journal of Happiness Studies is devoted to theoretical and applied advancements in all areas of well-being research. It covers topics referring to both the hedonic and eudaimonic perspectives characterizing well-being studies. The former includes the investigation of cognitive dimensions such as satisfaction with life, and positive affect and emotions. The latter includes the study of constructs and processes related to optimal psychological functioning, such as meaning and purpose in life, character strengths, personal growth, resilience, optimism, hope, and self-determination. In addition to contributions on appraisal of life-as-a-whole, the journal accepts papers investigating these topics in relation to specific domains, such as family, education, physical and mental health, and work.
The journal welcomes high-quality theoretical and empirical submissions in the fields of economics, psychology and sociology, as well as contributions from researchers in the domains of education, medicine, philosophy and other related fields.
The Journal of Happiness Studies provides a forum for three main areas in happiness research: 1) theoretical conceptualizations of well-being, happiness and the good life; 2) empirical investigation of well-being and happiness in different populations, contexts and cultures; 3) methodological advancements and development of new assessment instruments.
The journal addresses the conceptualization, operationalization and measurement of happiness and well-being dimensions, as well as the individual, socio-economic and cultural factors that may interact with them as determinants or outcomes.
Central Questions include, but are not limited to:
Conceptualization:
What meanings are denoted by terms like happiness and well-being?
How do these fit in with broader conceptions of the good life?
Operationalization and Measurement:
Which methods can be used to assess how people feel about life?
How to operationalize a new construct or an understudied dimension in the well-being domain?
What are the best measures for investigating specific well-being related constructs and dimensions?
Prevalence and causality
Do individuals belonging to different populations and cultures vary in their well-being ratings?
How does individual well-being relate to social and economic phenomena (characteristics, circumstances, behavior, events, and policies)?
What are the personal, social and economic determinants and causes of individual well-being dimensions?
Evaluation:
What are the consequences of well-being for individual development and socio-economic progress?
Are individual happiness and well-being worthwhile goals for governments and policy makers?
Does well-being represent a useful parameter to orient planning in physical and mental healthcare, and in public health?
Interdisciplinary studies:
How has the study of happiness developed within and across disciplines?
Can we link philosophical thought and empirical research?
What are the biological correlates of well-being dimensions?
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