Scepticism, evidential holism and the logic of demonic deception

Noûs Pub Date : 2024-02-14 DOI:10.1111/nous.12490
Samir Okasha
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Abstract

Sceptical arguments in epistemology typically employ sceptical hypotheses, which are rivals to our everyday beliefs so constructed that they fit exactly the evidence on which those beliefs are based. There are two ways of using a sceptical hypothesis to undermine an everyday belief, giving rise to two distinct sorts of sceptical argument: underdetermination-based and closure-based. However, both sorts of argument, as usually formulated in the literature, fall foul of evidential holism, for they ignore the crucial role of background beliefs. An analogy with the philosophy of science makes this point explicit. There is no simple way to “holism proof” the two sceptical arguments.
怀疑论、证据整体论和魔鬼欺骗的逻辑
认识论中的怀疑论证通常使用怀疑假说,这些假说是我们日常信念的对手,它们被构建得与这些信念所依据的证据完全吻合。使用怀疑假设来破坏日常信念有两种方法,这就产生了两种不同的怀疑论证:基于欠确定性的怀疑论证和基于封闭性的怀疑论证。然而,文献中通常提出的这两种论证都违背了证据整体论,因为它们忽视了背景信念的关键作用。与科学哲学的类比明确了这一点。要对这两种怀疑论进行 "整体论证明 "并不简单。
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