What Does "Least Restrictive" or "Less Restrictive" Mean in Mental Health Law? Contradictions and Confusion in the Case of Queensland, Australia.

IF 0.5 4区 社会学 Q3 LAW
American Journal of Law & Medicine Pub Date : 2023-07-01 Epub Date: 2024-02-12 DOI:10.1017/amj.2023.32
Julia Duffy, Sam Boyle, Katrine Del Villar
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Most legal systems in the West allow for involuntary treatment of mental illness, usually on the basis that without such treatment the person would be a danger to themselves or others. While historically the mental health law jurisdiction has been a protective one, it has become increasingly influenced by civil rights and international human rights law, which privilege the value of autonomy and the right to personal liberty.In this regard, an important principle that has developed is that decisions about treatment for mental illness must be the "least restrictive alternative" available. This may mean, for example, that a person is supported to make a decision on treatment for their mental illness, according to evolving practices of "supported decision-making," so that their legal capacity is still recognized. If involuntary treatment is required, the "least restrictive" approach demands that the liberty and integrity of the person be respected to the greatest extent possible.The Mental Health Act 2016 (Qld) ("MHAQ") prescribes that decision-making on non-consensual treatment should preferably be done according to what it calls the "less restrictive way." However, the "less restrictive way" is defined as decision-making by patients under advance directives, and also by substitute decision-makers, including by attorneys or guardians not appointed by the patient, usually a family member. The MHAQ states that these arrangements are distinguished from and prioritized over what it calls "involuntary treatment and care," where the decision for non-consensual treatment is made by the treating team.However, we argue that these arrangements are not in fact "less restrictive" of the person's autonomy, but are less accountable forms of decision-making. Decision-making by treating teams under involuntary treatment provisions is subject to higher levels of transparency and accountability. In Australian states these decisions are reviewed regularly by a specially constituted, independent mental health tribunal. By contrast, treatment decisions made under the "less restrictive way" are not even defined as constituting involuntary treatment, and are outside the scope of the tribunal's review.In the case of decision-making by advance directive, we acknowledge that this is widely considered to be "less restrictive" of a person's right to legal capacity and autonomy. However, in these cases, the patient may actually be refusing treatment at the time the advance directive is relied upon. This raises serious questions as to whether such "voluntary" admissions and treatment should not be subject to the same oversight and accountability as involuntary ones. Patients have a right to less restrictive forms of decision-making, but when deprived of their liberty, they also have a right to adequate safeguards established by law.The term "less restrictive" in the MHAQ is largely misplaced and misleading. In the case of advance directives, it deflects attention from the potentially restrictive nature of the treatment and the lack of accountability. Even more problematically, the privileging of private substitute decision-making under the less restrictive way ignores the real risk of abuse and undue influence within the personal and family sphere. We argue that the "less restrictive way" under the MHAQ is a step backwards for the rights of patients, in that it shifts power to family on the risky assumption that decision-making by these less supervised individuals is more likely to uphold human rights. We believe that this reflects a pre-feminist assumption that the informal, family, private sphere is nearly always safe. This is a contentious assumption, which nevertheless underpins much unproblematized thinking and advocacy on supported decision-making. This issue also highlights the need for further elucidation and discussion on what least restrictive means in the context of involuntary treatment for mental illness.

精神卫生法中的 "限制最少 "或 "限制较少 "是什么意思?澳大利亚昆士兰州案例中的矛盾与混淆。
西方国家的大多数法律制度都允许对精神疾病进行非自愿治疗,通常的依据是,如果不进行这种治疗,患者就会对自己或他人造成危险。虽然从历史上看,精神健康法的管辖范围一直是保护性的,但它越来越受到民权和国际人权法的影响,这些法律重视自主权和个人自由权的价值。举例来说,这可能意味着,根据 "辅助决策 "的不断发展,支持一个人就其精神疾病的治 疗做出决定,从而使其法律行为能力仍然得到承认。如果需要进行非自愿治疗,"限制性最小 "的方法要求最大限度地尊重患者的自由和人格完整。《2016 年精神健康法》(昆士兰州)("MHAQ")规定,非自愿治疗的决策最好按照它所称的 "限制性较小的方式 "进行。然而,"限制较少的方式 "被定义为由患者根据预先指令做出决策,以及由替代决策者做出决策,包括由非患者指定的律师或监护人(通常是家庭成员)做出决策。然而,我们认为,这些安排实际上并没有 "较少限制 "患者的自主权,而是一种较少问责的决策形式。治疗小组根据非自愿治疗规定做出的决定具有更高的透明度和问责性。在澳大利亚各州,这些决定由专门成立的独立精神健康法庭定期审查。相比之下,根据 "限制较少的方式 "做出的治疗决定甚至没有被定义为构成非自愿治疗,也不在审 判庭的审查范围之内。就预先指令的决策而言,我们承认这被广泛认为是对个人法律能力和自主权的 "限制较少"。然而,在这些情况下,病人在依赖预先指示时实际上可能正在拒绝接受治疗。这就提出了一个严重的问题,即这种 "自愿 "入院和治疗是否不应受到与非自愿入院和治疗相同的监督和问责。病人有权以限制性较小的形式作出决定,但在被剥夺自由时,他们也有权得到法律规定的适当保障。就预先指示而言,它转移了人们对治疗的潜在限制性和缺乏问责制的关注。更有问题的是,在限制性较小的方式下,私人替代决策的特权忽视了在个人和家庭范围内滥用和不当影响的真正风险。我们认为,《医疗质量管理手册》中的 "限制较少的方式 "是患者权利的倒退,因为它将权力转移给了家庭,而这种风险假设是,由这些监督较少的个人做出决定更有可能维护人权。我们认为,这反映了一种前女性主义的假设,即非正式的、家庭的、私人的领域几乎总是安全的。这是一个有争议的假设,但却支撑着很多关于辅助决策的无问题思考和倡导。这个问题还突出表明,有必要进一步阐明和讨论在非自愿治疗精神疾病的情况下,最 小限制性意味着什么。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
16.70%
发文量
8
期刊介绍: desde Enero 2004 Último Numero: Octubre 2008 AJLM will solicit blind comments from expert peer reviewers, including faculty members of our editorial board, as well as from other preeminent health law and public policy academics and professionals from across the country and around the world.
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