Quo vadis, Schuldenbremse? Über Sinn und Unsinn detaillierter Defizit- und Schuldenregelungen im Grundgesetz

Dirk Ehnts
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Abstract

The German debt brake forces the German government to target a very specific public deficit to GDP ratio. A ruling of the German constitutional court has drawn attention to the debt brake, as it is to be enforced more tightly than the federal German government previously thought. In this article, the author argues that the debt brake should be abolished. It does not do what it is supposed to do – the sustainability of public debt depends on the European Central Bank’s Dealer of Last Resort function and nothing else. As a side effect, the debt brake curtails government spending at a time of close to zero net public investment and huge requirements for more public spending.
债务刹车,何去何从?论《基本法》中详细的赤字和债务规定的意义和无稽之谈
德国的债务制动措施迫使德国政府将公共赤字与国内生产总值的比率设定为一个非常具体的目标。德国宪法法院的一项裁决引起了人们对债务制动器的关注,因为它的执行力度要比德国联邦政府之前想象的更为严格。在本文中,作者认为应废除债务制动器。它并没有起到应有的作用--公共债务的可持续性取决于欧洲中央银行的 "最后贷款人 "职能,而非其他。债务制动器的副作用是,在公共投资净值接近于零、需要大量增加公共开支的时候,它却限制了政府的开支。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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