“Thank me later”: Why is (macro)prudence desirable?

Abstract

We examine the social desirability of macroprudential measures, particularly those aimed at riskier home buyers. We examine the effectiveness of these measures against social costs, such as reduced access to the housing ladder for poorer households. Our analysis shows that the measures implemented so far have not limited access to credit or the housing markets. They have been effective in limiting the riskiest loans, minimizing negative equity episodes, reducing systemic risks by debilitating the house price-leverage spiral, and limiting the depths of contractions of a range of macro-financial variables. The welfare of households has also improved. Costs from these measures have been limited and have materialized through a rise in the age-income profile of first-time buyers, and somewhat more attenuated booms. Our results point to the conclusion that macroprudence is desirable when insulated from short-term interference and quick gains. The economy becomes more robust and even households in the lowest decile of the wealth distribution benefit from the general equilibrium effects of more stable financial provision.