Relative performance evaluation with business group affiliation as a source of common risk

IF 5.5 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Yoon K. Choi , Seung Hun Han , Yonghyun Kwon
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This study examines relative performance evaluation (RPE) for CEO compensation in business groups called “chaebols” in Korea. We find strong evidence of RPE when peers are member firms within the same business group, particularly when a firm has an established compensation committee or is run by a professional CEO (rather than a family CEO). This result is consistent with the argument that the affiliated firms within a business group may face significant common shocks affecting their performance. Therefore, aggregate group performance may be an excellent RPE benchmark for filtering out common risks from CEO compensation measurement.

以企业集团隶属关系作为共同风险源的相对绩效评估
本研究考察了韩国被称为 "财阀 "的企业集团中首席执行官薪酬的相对绩效评估(RPE)。我们发现,当同行是同一企业集团的成员公司时,尤其是当公司成立了薪酬委员会或由职业首席执行官(而非家族首席执行官)管理时,RPE 的证据非常充分。这一结果与以下论点相一致,即企业集团内的关联公司可能面临影响其业绩的重大共同冲击。因此,集团的总体业绩可能是一个很好的 RPE 基准,可以从 CEO 薪酬衡量中过滤掉共同风险。
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来源期刊
Global Finance Journal
Global Finance Journal BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
7.30
自引率
13.50%
发文量
106
审稿时长
53 days
期刊介绍: Global Finance Journal provides a forum for the exchange of ideas and techniques among academicians and practitioners and, thereby, advances applied research in global financial management. Global Finance Journal publishes original, creative, scholarly research that integrates theory and practice and addresses a readership in both business and academia. Articles reflecting pragmatic research are sought in areas such as financial management, investment, banking and financial services, accounting, and taxation. Global Finance Journal welcomes contributions from scholars in both the business and academic community and encourages collaborative research from this broad base worldwide.
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