{"title":"Multi-product airport competition and optimal airport charges","authors":"Xi Wan , Benteng Zou","doi":"10.1016/j.retrec.2024.101410","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper examines the importance of commercial revenue on optimal airport charges in a Hotelling-type duopoly airports competition. Each airport offers multi-products to heterogeneous consumers (airlines and passengers) and sets commercial and landing charges and serves. The airport-airline bundle competes for leisure and business passengers. The setting of landing charges under different regulatory regimes is investigated. We demonstrate that in the leisure travel market, which ignores schedule delay cost, the optimal landing fee is invariant to the regulatory scheme, and concession revenue is determined by an airport’s home market size. In the business travel market, the optimal landing charge is smaller if concession revenue is included in setting the landing fee than if it is not included. In the former case, increasing passenger volume does not guarantee increases in airports’ aeronautical revenue, and a negative impact may exist if the weight of concession profit out of total profit is small.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47810,"journal":{"name":"Research in Transportation Economics","volume":"103 ","pages":"Article 101410"},"PeriodicalIF":4.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Research in Transportation Economics","FirstCategoryId":"5","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0739885924000052","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper examines the importance of commercial revenue on optimal airport charges in a Hotelling-type duopoly airports competition. Each airport offers multi-products to heterogeneous consumers (airlines and passengers) and sets commercial and landing charges and serves. The airport-airline bundle competes for leisure and business passengers. The setting of landing charges under different regulatory regimes is investigated. We demonstrate that in the leisure travel market, which ignores schedule delay cost, the optimal landing fee is invariant to the regulatory scheme, and concession revenue is determined by an airport’s home market size. In the business travel market, the optimal landing charge is smaller if concession revenue is included in setting the landing fee than if it is not included. In the former case, increasing passenger volume does not guarantee increases in airports’ aeronautical revenue, and a negative impact may exist if the weight of concession profit out of total profit is small.
期刊介绍：
Research in Transportation Economics is a journal devoted to the dissemination of high quality economics research in the field of transportation. The content covers a wide variety of topics relating to the economics aspects of transportation, government regulatory policies regarding transportation, and issues of concern to transportation industry planners. The unifying theme throughout the papers is the application of economic theory and/or applied economic methodologies to transportation questions.
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