The fundamental facts can be logically simple

Noûs Pub Date : 2024-01-15 DOI:10.1111/nous.12487
Alexander Jackson
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Abstract

I like the view that the fundamental facts are logically simple, not complex. However, some universal generalizations and negations may appear fundamental, because they cannot be explained by logically simple facts about particulars. I explore a natural reply: those universal generalizations and negations are true because certain logically simple facts—call them φφ—are the fundamental facts. I argue that this solution is only available given some metaphysical frameworks, some conceptions of metaphysical explanation and fundamentality. It requires a ‘fitting’ framework, according to which metaphysical theories explain the aptness of representations in terms of how things are fundamentally. Fitting frameworks conceive of the fundamental facts as those that are metaphysically ‘real’; call them the ‘facts-in-reality’. Moreover, we must take as primary a plural notion of the facts-in-reality, not the singular notion of a fact-in-reality. By contrast, a metaphysics that grounds facts is incompatible with my strategy for keeping the fundamental facts logically simple.
基本事实在逻辑上可以很简单
我喜欢这样的观点,即基本事实在逻辑上是简单的,而不是复杂的。然而,一些普遍的概括和否定可能看起来是基本的,因为它们无法用关于具体事物的逻辑上简单的事实来解释。我探讨了一个自然的回答:这些普遍概括和否定之所以为真,是因为某些逻辑上简单的事实--称之为φφ--是基本事实。我认为,只有在某些形而上学框架、某些关于形而上学解释和基本性的概念中,才能找到这种解决方案。它需要一个 "契合 "的框架,根据这个框架,形而上学理论从事物的基本方式来解释表象的恰当性。契合框架将基本事实视为形而上学上的 "真实 "事实,称之为 "现实中的事实"。此外,我们必须把 "现实中的事实 "这一复数概念作为首要概念,而不是 "现实中的事实 "这一单数概念。相比之下,以事实为基础的形而上学与我保持基本事实在逻辑上的简单性的策略是不相容的。
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