{"title":"Généalogie de la liberté by Olivier Boulnois (review)","authors":"Kristell Trego","doi":"10.1353/hph.2024.a916717","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<span><span>In lieu of</span> an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:</span>\n<p> <span>Reviewed by:</span> <ul> <li><!-- html_title --> <em>Généalogie de la liberté</em> by Olivier Boulnois <!-- /html_title --></li> <li> Kristell Trego </li> </ul> Olivier Boulnois. <em>Généalogie de la liberté</em>. Paris: Seuil, 2021. Pp. 496. Paperback, €24.00. <p>The author starts from an apparently simple question: are we free? But such a question is not as simple as it seems. This book shows that it is neither eternal nor universally asked; rather, it is a question linked to a specific culture (the West), and it has a history. This is why the author intends to draw up its genealogy.</p> <p>In order to draw up a genealogy of the concept of freedom, we must leave aside the standard theoretical framework that assumes freedom as a given. Rather, we should ask: Does <strong>[End Page 152]</strong> freedom exist? What is its nature? Should it be described as the absence of compulsion or as the power of choice? We must also be wary of any systematic approach to these questions, such as those that have opposed partisans of freedom to determinists or intellectualists to voluntarists throughout the ages. If we want to draw up a genealogy of freedom, we should rather think about the theoretical conditions that made possible the birth and the development of this theoretical \"artifact,\" as Boulnois calls it (23). Contemporary discussions about freedom tend to debate its nature without wondering why such a concept was forged in the first place. By contrast, Boulnois takes a step back and tries to discover the nature of freedom by turning to the moment of its birth.</p> <p>Boulnois has adopted a genealogical approach in his previous books. He used it in his <em>Être et représentation</em>, whose subtitle is <em>une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l'époque de Duns Scot</em> (Paris: PUF, 1999). He also mentioned it in the title of a collection of edited essays, where he preferred to talk of \"genealog<em>ies</em>\" in the plural in order to accommodate the diversity of approaches adopted by the authors of the contributions to that volume (Olivier Boulnois, ed., <em>Généalogies du sujet: de saint Anselme à Malebranche</em> [Paris: Vrin, 2007]). In his new book, Boulnois explains his choice of the genealogical method as an attempt to give a history of freedom that might reconcile the so-called continental and analytic approaches (18). Instead of giving a simple description of theories of freedom, by his genealogical method Boulnois intends to show how the Western approach to freedom has resulted in an aporia—the very aporia that Kant diagnosed as an insoluble problem in his <em>Critique of Pure Reason</em>. Boulnois's genealogy should be distinguished from the so-called archeology as heralded by the French scholar of the Middle Ages Alain de Libera. Although both the genealogical and the archeological methods originate in the writings of Michel Foucault, and as such are undeniably connected to each other, the genealogical enterprise is intended to \"deconstruct\" past philosophers' claims not in order to leave them behind and reject them (as the archeological method intends to do), but rather to become fully aware of those philosophers' theoretical choices and commitments (see Boulnois, <em>Être et representation</em>, 16). Genealogy is thus supposed to \"liberate\" our thought by making apparent the framework in which we think.</p> <p>To deconstruct the problem of freedom, Boulnois proceeds in four main steps. First, he shows how the problem of freedom is constructed by examining a cluster of related concepts (<em>free will, will, power</em>, and <em>action</em>) and discovering the aporia of free will, which appears to be both indubitable and impossible to conceptualize. Second, Boulnois turns to Aristotle's ethics and theory of action, which conceives of human choices without appealing to the idea of freedom. Third, he considers the \"invention of freedom,\" or better of free will (in Latin, <em>liberum arbitrium voluntatis</em>), by highlighting three main moments: the Stoics' assent to the order of the world; Alexander of Aphrodisias's cogitations, which make room for free will in an Aristotelian framework, even without ever naming it; and finally, Augustine's reorganization of ethics around the very concept of free will. Fourth and finally, Boulnois focuses on the medieval debates concerning freedom and the way they contributed to contrasting human beings with the...</p> </p>","PeriodicalId":46448,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2024.a916717","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:
Reviewed by:
Généalogie de la liberté by Olivier Boulnois
Kristell Trego
Olivier Boulnois. Généalogie de la liberté. Paris: Seuil, 2021. Pp. 496. Paperback, €24.00.
The author starts from an apparently simple question: are we free? But such a question is not as simple as it seems. This book shows that it is neither eternal nor universally asked; rather, it is a question linked to a specific culture (the West), and it has a history. This is why the author intends to draw up its genealogy.
In order to draw up a genealogy of the concept of freedom, we must leave aside the standard theoretical framework that assumes freedom as a given. Rather, we should ask: Does [End Page 152] freedom exist? What is its nature? Should it be described as the absence of compulsion or as the power of choice? We must also be wary of any systematic approach to these questions, such as those that have opposed partisans of freedom to determinists or intellectualists to voluntarists throughout the ages. If we want to draw up a genealogy of freedom, we should rather think about the theoretical conditions that made possible the birth and the development of this theoretical "artifact," as Boulnois calls it (23). Contemporary discussions about freedom tend to debate its nature without wondering why such a concept was forged in the first place. By contrast, Boulnois takes a step back and tries to discover the nature of freedom by turning to the moment of its birth.
Boulnois has adopted a genealogical approach in his previous books. He used it in his Être et représentation, whose subtitle is une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l'époque de Duns Scot (Paris: PUF, 1999). He also mentioned it in the title of a collection of edited essays, where he preferred to talk of "genealogies" in the plural in order to accommodate the diversity of approaches adopted by the authors of the contributions to that volume (Olivier Boulnois, ed., Généalogies du sujet: de saint Anselme à Malebranche [Paris: Vrin, 2007]). In his new book, Boulnois explains his choice of the genealogical method as an attempt to give a history of freedom that might reconcile the so-called continental and analytic approaches (18). Instead of giving a simple description of theories of freedom, by his genealogical method Boulnois intends to show how the Western approach to freedom has resulted in an aporia—the very aporia that Kant diagnosed as an insoluble problem in his Critique of Pure Reason. Boulnois's genealogy should be distinguished from the so-called archeology as heralded by the French scholar of the Middle Ages Alain de Libera. Although both the genealogical and the archeological methods originate in the writings of Michel Foucault, and as such are undeniably connected to each other, the genealogical enterprise is intended to "deconstruct" past philosophers' claims not in order to leave them behind and reject them (as the archeological method intends to do), but rather to become fully aware of those philosophers' theoretical choices and commitments (see Boulnois, Être et representation, 16). Genealogy is thus supposed to "liberate" our thought by making apparent the framework in which we think.
To deconstruct the problem of freedom, Boulnois proceeds in four main steps. First, he shows how the problem of freedom is constructed by examining a cluster of related concepts (free will, will, power, and action) and discovering the aporia of free will, which appears to be both indubitable and impossible to conceptualize. Second, Boulnois turns to Aristotle's ethics and theory of action, which conceives of human choices without appealing to the idea of freedom. Third, he considers the "invention of freedom," or better of free will (in Latin, liberum arbitrium voluntatis), by highlighting three main moments: the Stoics' assent to the order of the world; Alexander of Aphrodisias's cogitations, which make room for free will in an Aristotelian framework, even without ever naming it; and finally, Augustine's reorganization of ethics around the very concept of free will. Fourth and finally, Boulnois focuses on the medieval debates concerning freedom and the way they contributed to contrasting human beings with the...
以下是内容的简要摘录,以代替摘要:评论者 奥利维尔-布尔努瓦著《自由的源流》 克里斯特雷戈-奥利维尔-布尔努瓦。Généalogie de la liberté.巴黎:Seuil,2021 年。Pp.496.平装本,24.00 欧元。作者从一个看似简单的问题出发:我们自由吗?但这个问题并不像看上去那么简单。本书表明,这个问题既不是永恒的,也不是普遍存在的;相反,它是一个与特定文化(西方)相关联的问题,是有历史的。这就是作者打算绘制其谱系的原因。为了勾勒出自由概念的谱系,我们必须抛开将自由假定为既定事实的标准理论框架。相反,我们应该问自由是否存在?它的本质是什么?它应该被描述为没有强迫还是有选择的权力?我们还必须警惕对这些问题采取任何系统化的方法,例如,古往今来将自由的游击队员与决定论者或知识分子与意志论者对立起来的方法。如果我们想要勾勒出自由的谱系,那么我们更应该思考的是,这一理论 "艺术品"(布尔诺瓦称之为 "自由")得以诞生和发展的理论条件(23)。当代关于自由的讨论倾向于争论自由的本质,而不去思考为什么要首先创建这样一个概念。相比之下,布尔诺瓦则退后一步,试图从自由诞生的那一刻来发现自由的本质。布尔诺瓦在之前的著作中采用了谱系学的方法。他在《存在与再现》(Être et représentation)一书中采用了这种方法,该书的副标题是 "邓斯-斯考特时代的现代形而上学谱系"(une généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l'époque de Duns Scot,巴黎:PUF,1999 年)。他还在编辑的论文集的标题中提到了这一点,他倾向于用复数来谈论 "系谱",以适应该书作者所采用的方法的多样性(Olivier Boulnois, ed., Généalogies du sujet: de saint Anselme à Malebranche [Paris: Vrin, 2007])。在新书中,布尔诺瓦解释说,他选择系谱学方法是为了试图描述一部自由史,以调和所谓的大陆方法和分析方法(18)。布尔诺瓦并没有简单地描述自由理论,而是通过他的谱系学方法,试图说明西方的自由方法是如何导致 "poria "的--康德在《纯粹理性批判》中将 "poria "诊断为一个无法解决的问题。布尔诺瓦的谱系学应该与法国中世纪学者阿兰-德-利伯拉(Alain de Libera)所倡导的所谓考古学有所区别。虽然谱系学方法和考古学方法都源于米歇尔-福柯的著作,因此不可否认两者之间存在着联系,但谱系学的目的是 "解构 "过去哲学家的主张,而不是像考古学方法那样将其抛在脑后并加以摒弃,而是要充分认识到这些哲学家的理论选择和承诺(见 Boulnois, Être et representation, 16)。因此,家谱学应该通过揭示我们思考的框架来 "解放 "我们的思想。为了解构自由问题,布尔诺瓦分四个主要步骤进行。首先,他通过考察一组相关概念(自由意志、意志、权力和行动),发现了自由意志的缺憾(aporia),即自由意志似乎既是不容置疑的,又是不可能概念化的,从而展示了自由问题是如何建构起来的。其次,布诺瓦转向亚里士多德的伦理学和行动理论,该理论设想了人类的选择,但没有诉诸自由的理念。第三,他探讨了 "自由的发明",或者说自由意志的发明(拉丁语:liberum arbitrium voluntatis),强调了三个主要时刻:斯多葛学派对世界秩序的认同;阿弗罗狄西亚的亚历山大的思考,在亚里士多德的框架内为自由意志留出了空间,即使从未对其进行命名;最后,奥古斯丁围绕自由意志这一概念对伦理学进行了重组。第四,也是最后一点,布尔诺瓦着重探讨了中世纪关于自由的争论,以及这些争论是如何将人类与自然界进行对比的。
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