Managerial overconfidence and corporate information disclosure

Abstract

By extracting detailed birth information for managers of Chinese listed firms from 2011 to 2021, we developed a novel measure of overconfidence and applied it to the corporate information disclosure. Our findings demonstrated a close association between managerial overconfidence and both mandatory and voluntary disclosure behaviors exhibited by firms. Specifically, managerial overconfidence significantly contributed to an increase in accrual-based earnings management and the voluntary disclosure of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) information by firms. Furthermore, we observed that overconfident managers were more inclined to adopt a positive disclosure tone and tend to underestimate future risks in forward-looking information disclosure. In our additional analysis, we uncovered evidence suggesting that various factors, including corporate governance practices, the types of actual controllers, financing constraints, analyst following, and market competition, might all play a role in influencing corporate information disclosure behavior driven by managerial overconfidence. This study expands on the economic implications of the Upper Echelons Theory and offers pertinent recommendations to enhance the quality of information disclosure.