How does autonomous vehicles affect taxi industry? A two-stage Van Damme based tripartite evolutionary game perspective

Abstract

As urban passenger transportation focuses more on economic efficiency and road safety, autonomous driving technology is being introduced in the taxi industry. Interests differ among automobile manufacturers, taxi companies, and the government in promoting the adoption of autonomous taxis (ATs). This paper investigates the impact of multiple factors in the mixed traffic operation mode on the tripartite game using the two-stage Van Damme model. It also analyzes the game-breaking key to automobile manufactures' decision in the dual stable situation. The findings are as follows: (1) Under government non-promotion, independent R&D guides taxi companies to adopt ATs more effectively. Under government promotion, the social acceptance and loss of technology dominance have varying impacts on the game results. (2) Adjusting infrastructure cost and subsidy intensity can lead to a single stable situation when taxi companies and the government adopt a wait-and-see approach. (3) The loss of technology dominance shifts game leader from automobile manufacturers to the government. (4) Taxi companies would only adopt ATs when the social acceptance is moderate, as it exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship. These findings provide valuable insights for how to better promote the adoption of ATs under both promotion and non-promotion by the government.