Responsibility gaps and self-interest bias: People attribute moral responsibility to AI for their own but not others' transgressions

IF 3.2 2区 心理学 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL
Mengchen Dong , Konrad Bocian
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Abstract

In the last decade, the ambiguity and difficulty of responsibility attribution to AI and human stakeholders (i.e., responsibility gaps) has been increasingly relevant and discussed in extreme cases (e.g., autonomous weapons). On top of related philosophical debates, the current research provides empirical evidence on the importance of bridging responsibility gaps from a psychological and motivational perspective. In three pre-registered studies (N = 1259), we examined moral judgments in hybrid moral situations, where both a human and an AI were involved as moral actors and arguably responsible for a moral consequence. We found that people consistently showed a self-interest bias in the evaluation of hybrid transgressions, such that they judged the human actors more leniently when they were depicted as themselves (vs. others; Studies 1 and 2) and ingroup (vs. outgroup; Study 3) members. Moreover, this bias did not necessarily emerge when moral actors caused positive (instead of negative) moral consequences (Study 2), and could be accounted for by the flexible responsibility attribution to AI (i.e., ascribing more responsibility to AI when judging the self rather than others; Studies 1 and 2). The findings suggest that people may dynamically exploit the “moral wiggle room” in hybrid moral situations and reason about AI's responsibility to serve their self-interest.

责任差距和利己偏见:人们将自己的道德责任归咎于人工智能,而不是他人的过失
在过去十年中,人工智能和人类利益相关者在责任归属上的模糊性和困难性(即责任差距)越来越受到关注,在极端情况下(如自主武器)的讨论也越来越多。除了相关的哲学争论之外,当前的研究还从心理学和动机的角度提供了实证证据,说明弥合责任差距的重要性。在三项预先登记的研究(N = 1259)中,我们考察了混合道德情境中的道德判断,在这种情境中,人类和人工智能都是道德行动者,可以说都对道德后果负有责任。我们发现,人们在评价混合违法行为时始终表现出一种自我利益偏差,当人类行为者被描述为自己(相对于他人;研究 1 和研究 2)和内群(相对于外群;研究 3)成员时,他们会对人类行为者做出更宽松的判断。此外,当道德行为者造成积极(而非消极)的道德后果时(研究 2),这种偏差并不一定会出现,而且可以通过对人工智能的灵活责任归因来解释(即在判断自己而非他人时,将更多责任归因于人工智能;研究 1 和 2)。研究结果表明,在混合道德情境中,人们可能会动态地利用 "道德回旋余地",推理人工智能的责任,以服务于自身利益。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.30
自引率
2.90%
发文量
134
期刊介绍: The Journal of Experimental Social Psychology publishes original research and theory on human social behavior and related phenomena. The journal emphasizes empirical, conceptually based research that advances an understanding of important social psychological processes. The journal also publishes literature reviews, theoretical analyses, and methodological comments.
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