Why do audit clients voluntarily disclose the compliance and planning components of auditor provided tax services?

Abstract

Criticisms of audit firms marketing and devising tax avoidance strategies for their audit clients have led to calls from regulators, investors, and proxy advisors for more detailed disclosures on the composition of tax non-audit services (NAS). Using a hand-collected dataset, we examine the determinants of audit clients’ voluntary bifurcation of total tax NAS fees into the tax planning and compliance components, and the effect of these voluntary disclosures on firm value. We find that firms with higher levels of tax NAS are more likely to provide this disclosure, as well as firms that engage in higher levels of tax avoidance and have accounting experts serve on the audit committee. Using textual analysis, we find that among voluntary tax NAS fee breakdown disclosers, firms with higher total tax and, specifically, tax planning NAS fees have longer and less similar tax NAS fee disclosures relative to the prior period disclosure. Our firm value analyses indicate higher valuations for firms providing voluntary breakdown disclosures when these disclosures reveal high tax NAS fees generally, and high tax planning NAS fees specifically. The firm valuation effects are incrementally more pronounced when voluntary tax NAS fee breakdown firms report higher tax avoidance and expert audit committee oversight. Our results suggest that the voluntary disclosure of private information regarding the nature of tax NAS is one mechanism through which firms facing scrutiny over the implications of these services can alleviate information asymmetry and stakeholder skepticism of tax NAS.