{"title":"What makes us “we”? The positivity bias in essentialist beliefs about group attributes","authors":"Kaiyuan Chen, Michael A. Hogg","doi":"10.1016/j.jesp.2023.104581","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Psychological essentialism refers to the tendency to view entities as having enduring properties that make them what they are (i.e., essences). Emerging research suggests people possess a positivity bias in essentialism (PBE), a preference to view positively (vs. negatively) evaluated attributes as the essences of an entity. Four experiments (total <em>N</em> = 1020) tested group attributes' association (ingroup vs. outgroup) as a boundary condition of PBE. We expected PBE to be stronger for ingroup than for outgroup and this difference to be accentuated by (a) identity centrality and (b) self-uncertainty. In Studies 1–3, we asked participants to generate one positive attribute and one negative attribute for ingroup and outgroup respectively and measured PBE. PBE was found to be stronger for ingroup attributes and was even reversed for outgroup attributes. Identity centrality, but not self-uncertainty, accentuated this effect. In the pre-registered Study 4, we asked participants to generate as many attributes as possible and replicated the main findings. Moreover, we found differences in PBE, along with intergroup affect, prospectively accounted for intergroup cooperative intentions. The findings suggest that essentialist beliefs about attributes are constrained by collective self-enhancement and have unique implications in intergroup contexts.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48441,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","volume":"111 ","pages":"Article 104581"},"PeriodicalIF":3.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Experimental Social Psychology","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103123001385","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Psychological essentialism refers to the tendency to view entities as having enduring properties that make them what they are (i.e., essences). Emerging research suggests people possess a positivity bias in essentialism (PBE), a preference to view positively (vs. negatively) evaluated attributes as the essences of an entity. Four experiments (total N = 1020) tested group attributes' association (ingroup vs. outgroup) as a boundary condition of PBE. We expected PBE to be stronger for ingroup than for outgroup and this difference to be accentuated by (a) identity centrality and (b) self-uncertainty. In Studies 1–3, we asked participants to generate one positive attribute and one negative attribute for ingroup and outgroup respectively and measured PBE. PBE was found to be stronger for ingroup attributes and was even reversed for outgroup attributes. Identity centrality, but not self-uncertainty, accentuated this effect. In the pre-registered Study 4, we asked participants to generate as many attributes as possible and replicated the main findings. Moreover, we found differences in PBE, along with intergroup affect, prospectively accounted for intergroup cooperative intentions. The findings suggest that essentialist beliefs about attributes are constrained by collective self-enhancement and have unique implications in intergroup contexts.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Experimental Social Psychology publishes original research and theory on human social behavior and related phenomena. The journal emphasizes empirical, conceptually based research that advances an understanding of important social psychological processes. The journal also publishes literature reviews, theoretical analyses, and methodological comments.