Evading Capture: U.S. Army Engineers and Railroad Policy, 1827–1853

IF 0.4 4区 历史学 Q1 HISTORY
ROBERT KAMINSKI
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Abstract

Until 1838 the U.S. government lent railroads Army engineers to survey routes. Though not strictly regulators, these army engineers would consequently face powerful versions of the incentives that make regulatory capture a pervasive problem—including an intensified “revolving door,” the opportunity for institutional empire building, and a fertile ground for cognitive capture. Nevertheless, engineering officers would push to abolish federal railroad aid, succeeding by 1838. This article argues that they turned against railroad aid when the nation’s growing rail network revitalized long-standing republican hopes of replacing standing armies and fortifications with floating batteries and militias. Though this scheme was strategically quixotic, Jacksonian populism and fiscal retrenchment during the Panic of 1837 combined with the transportation revolution to make it appear a credible threat to the Corps’s institutional raison d’être—building coastal fortifications. Engineers thus turned against railroad aid to protect their core competency, highlighting underappreciated tensions between institutional and industry interests.

逃避追捕:美国陆军工程师与铁路政策,1827-1853 年
直到1838年,美国政府才派出铁路工程师勘测路线。虽然不是严格意义上的监管者,但这些陆军工程师最终将面临强大的激励机制,这些激励机制使监管俘获成为一个普遍存在的问题——包括强化的“旋转门”,建立制度帝国的机会,以及认知俘获的肥沃土壤。然而,工程官员将推动废除联邦铁路援助,并在1838年取得成功。这篇文章认为,当国家不断增长的铁路网重振了共和党长期以来希望用浮动炮台和民兵取代常备军和防御工事的希望时,他们转而反对铁路援助。虽然这个计划在战略上是不切实际的,但杰克逊式的民粹主义和1837年大恐慌期间的财政紧缩,再加上交通革命,使它看起来对海军陆战队建立être-building海岸防御工事的制度理由构成了可信的威胁。因此,工程师们转而反对铁路援助,以保护他们的核心竞争力,突显了机构和行业利益之间被低估的紧张关系。
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CiteScore
0.50
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