Some Remarks on Recent Formalist Responses to the Hole Argument

IF 1.2 3区物理与天体物理 Q3 PHYSICS, MULTIDISCIPLINARY

Foundations of Physics Pub Date : 2023-12-11 DOI:10.1007/s10701-023-00746-2

Tushar Menon, James Read

引用次数: 0

Abstract

In a recent article, Halvorson and Manchak (Br J Philos Sci, Forthcoming) claim that there is no basis for the Hole Argument, because (in a certain sense) hole isometries are unique. This raises two important questions: (a) does their argument succeed?; (b) how does this formalist response to the Hole Argument relate to other recent responses to the Hole Argument in the same tradition—in particular, that of Weatherall (Br J Philos Sci 69(2):329–350, 2018)? In this article, ad (a), we argue that Halvorson and Manchak’s claim does not go through; ad (b), we argue that although one prima facie plausible reading would see Halvorson and Manchak as filling an important hole (no pun intended) in Weatherall’s argument, in fact this reading is implausible; there is no need to supplement Weatherall’s work with Halvorson and Manchak’s results.

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关于近期形式主义对洞穴论证的回应的一些评论

在最近的一篇文章中，哈尔沃森和曼查克（Br J Philos Sci，即将出版）声称洞论证没有依据，因为（在某种意义上）洞等距是唯一的。这就提出了两个重要问题：(a) 他们的论证成功吗；(b) 对孔洞论证的这种形式主义回应与同一传统中对孔洞论证的其他最新回应--尤其是韦瑟拉尔（Br J Philos Sci 69(2):329-350, 2018）的回应--有何关联？在本文中，广告（a），我们认为哈尔沃森和曼查克的主张并不成立；广告（b），我们认为尽管一种表面上看似合理的解读会认为哈尔沃森和曼查克填补了韦瑟拉尔论证中的一个重要漏洞（没有双关语），但事实上这种解读是不可信的；没有必要用哈尔沃森和曼查克的结果来补充韦瑟拉尔的工作。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Foundations of Physics 物理-物理：综合

CiteScore

2.70

自引率

6.70%

发文量

104

审稿时长

6-12 weeks

期刊介绍： The conceptual foundations of physics have been under constant revision from the outset, and remain so today. Discussion of foundational issues has always been a major source of progress in science, on a par with empirical knowledge and mathematics. Examples include the debates on the nature of space and time involving Newton and later Einstein; on the nature of heat and of energy; on irreversibility and probability due to Boltzmann; on the nature of matter and observation measurement during the early days of quantum theory; on the meaning of renormalisation, and many others. Today, insightful reflection on the conceptual structure utilised in our efforts to understand the physical world is of particular value, given the serious unsolved problems that are likely to demand, once again, modifications of the grammar of our scientific description of the physical world. The quantum properties of gravity, the nature of measurement in quantum mechanics, the primary source of irreversibility, the role of information in physics – all these are examples of questions about which science is still confused and whose solution may well demand more than skilled mathematics and new experiments. Foundations of Physics is a privileged forum for discussing such foundational issues, open to physicists, cosmologists, philosophers and mathematicians. It is devoted to the conceptual bases of the fundamental theories of physics and cosmology, to their logical, methodological, and philosophical premises. The journal welcomes papers on issues such as the foundations of special and general relativity, quantum theory, classical and quantum field theory, quantum gravity, unified theories, thermodynamics, statistical mechanics, cosmology, and similar.