Shocks to issue salience and electoral competition

IF 1.2 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Enriqueta Aragonès, Clara Ponsatí
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We propose a two party electoral competition model to analyze the effects of an exogenous shock over the relative issue salience on the strategic policy choices of the parties. We find that both parties strategically shift their policy choices from their ideal points towards the ideal point of the median voter of the newly salient issue. The polarization of the distribution of the voters preferences produces a disadvantage for one of the parties, which is forced to implement a large policy shift. We argue that a large policy shift may break a party internal balance among its different factions, which in turn may produce important disruptions in the party system. We illustrate our arguments with an analysis of recent events in Catalonia and the UK.

冲击问题的突出和选举竞争
我们提出了一个两党选举竞争模型来分析外生冲击对相对问题显著性对两党战略政策选择的影响。我们发现,两党在战略上都将他们的政策选择从他们的理想点转向了中间选民对新突出问题的理想点。选民偏好分布的两极分化使其中一个政党处于不利地位,它被迫实施大规模的政策转变。我们认为,一个大的政策转变可能会打破一个政党内部不同派系之间的平衡,这反过来可能会对政党制度产生重要的破坏。我们通过对加泰罗尼亚和英国最近发生的事件的分析来说明我们的论点。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
22
期刊介绍: Economics of Governance aims to foster research on governance at many levels: corporations, non-profit organizations, local and federal governments, and international organizations. Applications include the internal organization of firms, corporate governance, the private provision of public goods, local public policies, relations across levels of government, public expenditure and regulation, and problems of credibility and enforcement of international agreements. Though the journal aims to contribute to general economic knowledge, it is also interested in applying theoretical and empirical insights to important current topics. The journal is open to many approaches, including formal theoretical analysis, systematic observation, simulation, and empirical studies. Interdisciplinary contributions by economists, organizational scholars, and political scientists are encouraged. Officially cited as: Econ Gov
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