Beyond Information Costs: Preference Formation and the Architecture of Property Law

IF 3 1区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Zhang T.
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
Contemporary property theory highlights information costs as the central determinant of exclusion rights and numerus clausus-type standardization: rising information costs lead to stronger exclusion rights and more standardization, whereas falling information costs have the opposite effect. This paradigmatic model lacks, however, a theory of how information costs change in the first place. By developing such a theory, this article demonstrates that, in prominent cases, the legal impact of information costs tends to be counterbalanced by concurrent changes in individual preference, and that preexisting predictions about the relationship between information costs, standardization, and exclusion are therefore partially wrong, and otherwise incomplete.
超越信息成本:偏好形成与物权法架构
摘要当代产权理论强调信息成本是排他权和众多条款式标准化的核心决定因素:信息成本的上升导致排他权的增强和标准化程度的提高,而信息成本的下降则产生相反的效果。然而,这种范式模型首先缺乏一个关于信息成本如何变化的理论。通过发展这样一个理论,本文表明,在一些突出的案例中,信息成本的法律影响往往被个人偏好的同步变化所抵消,因此,先前关于信息成本、标准化和排斥之间关系的预测部分是错误的,否则就是不完整的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
3
审稿时长
16 weeks
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