Exit strategy or springboard for career development? The case of university executives' remuneration

IF 2.8 Q1 EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
Alice Civera, Erik E. Lehmann, Michele Meoli, Jonah M. Otto, Stefano Paleari
{"title":"Exit strategy or springboard for career development? The case of university executives' remuneration","authors":"Alice Civera,&nbsp;Erik E. Lehmann,&nbsp;Michele Meoli,&nbsp;Jonah M. Otto,&nbsp;Stefano Paleari","doi":"10.1111/hequ.12482","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>The steady increase of chief executives' compensation in both public and private universities has long been at the centre of public debate and has received a lot of criticism in the UK. As higher education is considered as an industry, a pay for performance relationship is expected. This paper differs by demonstrating that UK Vice Chancellors consider incentives other than remuneration in their career progression. By constructing a comprehensive dataset of UK Vice Chancellors covering academic years 2012/2013 to 2016/2017, we demonstrate that UK university chief executives, especially if young, are willing to accept lower salaries when they interpret their role as a springboard for visible high-profile positions in the public arena.</p>","PeriodicalId":51607,"journal":{"name":"HIGHER EDUCATION QUARTERLY","volume":"78 3","pages":"730-744"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/hequ.12482","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"HIGHER EDUCATION QUARTERLY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/hequ.12482","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

The steady increase of chief executives' compensation in both public and private universities has long been at the centre of public debate and has received a lot of criticism in the UK. As higher education is considered as an industry, a pay for performance relationship is expected. This paper differs by demonstrating that UK Vice Chancellors consider incentives other than remuneration in their career progression. By constructing a comprehensive dataset of UK Vice Chancellors covering academic years 2012/2013 to 2016/2017, we demonstrate that UK university chief executives, especially if young, are willing to accept lower salaries when they interpret their role as a springboard for visible high-profile positions in the public arena.

退出策略还是职业发展的跳板?大学高管薪酬的案例
长期以来,公立和私立大学首席执行官薪酬的稳步增长一直是公众辩论的焦点,在英国也受到了很多批评。由于高等教育被视为一种产业,因此预期会出现绩效报酬关系。本文的不同之处在于,英国副校长在职业发展中考虑的是薪酬以外的激励措施。通过构建涵盖2012/2013学年至2016/2017学年的英国副校长的综合数据集,我们证明了英国大学的首席执行官,特别是年轻的首席执行官,当他们将自己的角色视为在公共领域获得引人注目的高调职位的跳板时,他们愿意接受较低的薪水。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
HIGHER EDUCATION QUARTERLY
HIGHER EDUCATION QUARTERLY EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH-
CiteScore
4.50
自引率
9.10%
发文量
42
期刊介绍: Higher Education Quarterly publishes articles concerned with policy, strategic management and ideas in higher education. A substantial part of its contents is concerned with reporting research findings in ways that bring out their relevance to senior managers and policy makers at institutional and national levels, and to academics who are not necessarily specialists in the academic study of higher education. Higher Education Quarterly also publishes papers that are not based on empirical research but give thoughtful academic analyses of significant policy, management or academic issues.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信