An Analysis of Voting and Legislative Behavior

Abstract

Despite the scope and breadth of applied behavior analysis (ABA) over its 60-year history, little attention has been directed toward the formulation and implementation of public policy. This lack of attention is notable because Skinner (1953) posited that government is probably the most obvious agency engaged in the control of human behavior. Although behavioral strategies have been employed to address policy issues, most studies examined small groups in circumscribed settings. Glenn’s (1988) conceptualization of the metacontingency provided a framework for examining public policymaking, with culturo-behavioral science rapidly emerging as a means to further advance our understanding of the complex interactions involved in social and cultural systems (Glenn, 2003; Malott & Glenn, 2019) and the continuing evolution of public policy. This article focuses on voting as an operant behavior and the interlocking behavioral contingencies (IBCs) at play when citizens vote at the polls and lawmakers are voting on potential legislation. Because virtually all legislative bodies have specific protocols regarding everything from legislative drafting to floor debate, the majority of their activity involves rule-governed behavior. In contrast, the votes which a legislator casts, like those of the general public in an election, are contingency-shaped behaviors. One key difference between the vote cast by a private citizen and a legislator are the external consequences that can be imposed following the vote by legislative or governmental leaders. Despite having only a small number of behavior analysts serving in legislatures, recent successes surrounding licensure and mandated insurance coverage for behavior analysis have resulted in a greater awareness by legislators and policymakers of the need and value of such services, suggesting that this is an opportune time for behavior analysts to become more involved and shape public policy.