Conflict, cooperation, and institutional choice

IF 3.2 2区 心理学 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL
Shuxian Jin , Simon Columbus , Paul A.M. van Lange , Daniel Balliet
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Abstract

Social situations may vary in the severity of conflict between self-interest and collective welfare, and thereby pose collective action problems that might require different institutional solutions. The present study examines the effect of conflict of interests on beliefs, norms, cooperation, and choice of sanctioning institutions in social dilemmas across two experiments (total N = 1304). In each experiment, participants interacted in a public goods game (PGG), and a modified PGG with institutional choice using a 2 (conflict of interests: low vs. high) × 3 (institutional choice: peer punishment/no sanction vs. centralized punishment/no sanction vs. gossip plus ostracism/no sanction) between-participants design. More severe conflict of interests reduces individuals' own cooperation, first-order beliefs about others' cooperation, second-order normative expectations and personal norms of cooperation. This pattern is pronounced over time in repeated interactions. We did not find that conflict of interests influenced the choice to establish a sanctioning institution. Taken together, the challenges arising from stronger conflicting interests can cause the collapse of cooperation, hinder the emergence of trust and norms of cooperation, but do not provide the impetus to support a sanctioning institution to promote cooperation. Implications for solving public goods dilemmas that contain a severe conflict of interests are discussed.

冲突、合作和制度选择
社会状况在自身利益与集体福利之间的冲突的严重程度上可能有所不同,从而产生可能需要不同制度解决方案的集体行动问题。本研究通过两个实验(总N = 1304)考察了社会困境中利益冲突对信念、规范、合作和制裁制度选择的影响。在每个实验中,参与者在公共物品博弈(public goods game, PGG)中进行互动,并使用2(利益冲突:低vs高)× 3(制度选择:同伴惩罚/不制裁vs集中惩罚/不制裁vs闲话加排斥/不制裁)的参与者之间设计改进的带有制度选择的PGG。更严重的利益冲突降低了个体自身的合作、对他人合作的一阶信念、二阶规范期望和个人合作规范。随着时间的推移,这种模式会在反复的互动中显现出来。我们没有发现利益冲突影响了设立制裁机构的选择。总而言之,利益冲突加剧所带来的挑战可能导致合作的崩溃,阻碍信任和合作规范的出现,但不会提供支持制裁机构以促进合作的动力。讨论了解决包含严重利益冲突的公共产品困境的含义。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.30
自引率
2.90%
发文量
134
期刊介绍: The Journal of Experimental Social Psychology publishes original research and theory on human social behavior and related phenomena. The journal emphasizes empirical, conceptually based research that advances an understanding of important social psychological processes. The journal also publishes literature reviews, theoretical analyses, and methodological comments.
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