Performing central bank independence: The Bank of England's communicative financial stability strategy

IF 3.2 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Andrew Baker, Andrew Hindmoor, Sean McDaniel
{"title":"Performing central bank independence: The Bank of England's communicative financial stability strategy","authors":"Andrew Baker, Andrew Hindmoor, Sean McDaniel","doi":"10.1111/rego.12564","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Central bank independence (CBI) has been one of the most significant regulatory state developments of the last three decades. Following the 2008 financial crisis, many central bank mandates were extended to include a responsibility for financial stability. Some commentators claim this jeopardizes CBI by drawing central banks into contested political issues that can impact financial stability, in what we term an independence in decline thesis. Through a detailed study of the Bank of England's financial stability communications employing the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) codebook, we subject this independence in decline thesis to scrutiny. We show that since the extension of the Bank's mandate in 2011, Bank officials have discussed a wider range of more contentious policy issues. However, these communications appear to date to have largely reinforced the Bank's reputation for technical competence and political neutrality. In this sense, central bank “communicative agency” can be deployed to protect CBI performatively, while CBI can in turn be studied and understood as an ongoing communicative performance act. We find that repoliticization is a more contingent process than much central banking literature has allowed for, while financial stability communications are a potentially powerful regulatory instrument deserving of more scholarly attention.","PeriodicalId":21026,"journal":{"name":"Regulation & Governance","volume":"113 46","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Regulation & Governance","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12564","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Central bank independence (CBI) has been one of the most significant regulatory state developments of the last three decades. Following the 2008 financial crisis, many central bank mandates were extended to include a responsibility for financial stability. Some commentators claim this jeopardizes CBI by drawing central banks into contested political issues that can impact financial stability, in what we term an independence in decline thesis. Through a detailed study of the Bank of England's financial stability communications employing the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) codebook, we subject this independence in decline thesis to scrutiny. We show that since the extension of the Bank's mandate in 2011, Bank officials have discussed a wider range of more contentious policy issues. However, these communications appear to date to have largely reinforced the Bank's reputation for technical competence and political neutrality. In this sense, central bank “communicative agency” can be deployed to protect CBI performatively, while CBI can in turn be studied and understood as an ongoing communicative performance act. We find that repoliticization is a more contingent process than much central banking literature has allowed for, while financial stability communications are a potentially powerful regulatory instrument deserving of more scholarly attention.
执行中央银行独立性:英格兰银行的沟通金融稳定战略
中央银行独立性(CBI)是过去三十年来最重要的国家监管发展之一。2008年金融危机之后,许多央行的职责被扩大,包括了维护金融稳定的责任。一些评论人士声称,这种做法将央行卷入可能影响金融稳定的有争议的政治问题,从而危及CBI,我们称之为“独立性下降论”。通过使用比较议程项目(CAP)代码本对英格兰银行的金融稳定沟通进行详细研究,我们对这种独立性下降的论点进行了审查。报告显示,自2011年世行任期延长以来,世行官员讨论了范围更广、更具争议性的政策问题。然而,迄今为止,这些通讯似乎在很大程度上加强了世界银行在技术能力和政治中立方面的声誉。从这个意义上说,中央银行的“沟通机构”可以被部署到对CBI的行为保护中,而CBI则可以被研究和理解为一种持续的沟通行为。我们发现,再政治化是一个比许多央行文献所允许的更具偶然性的过程,而金融稳定沟通是一种潜在的强大监管工具,值得更多的学术关注。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
CiteScore
7.80
自引率
10.00%
发文量
57
期刊介绍: Regulation & Governance serves as the leading platform for the study of regulation and governance by political scientists, lawyers, sociologists, historians, criminologists, psychologists, anthropologists, economists and others. Research on regulation and governance, once fragmented across various disciplines and subject areas, has emerged at the cutting edge of paradigmatic change in the social sciences. Through the peer-reviewed journal Regulation & Governance, we seek to advance discussions between various disciplines about regulation and governance, promote the development of new theoretical and empirical understanding, and serve the growing needs of practitioners for a useful academic reference.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信