Climate change and the problem of social cost

William K. Jaeger
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Abstract

This paper assesses the prospects for climate stabilization from both positive and normative economic perspectives, and with an eye to the conditions necessary for collective action across the three domains: domestic, international, and intergenerational. While it is well-established that international freeriding and transaction costs pose major impediments to successful environmental agreements, this analysis identifies the intergenerational domain as the source of intractability due to long delays between bearing the mitigation costs and enjoying their eventual climate benefits. This lag causes the net benefits for median-aged voters’ to be negative over their expected remaining lifespans. Drawing from several Integrated Assessment Models of the benefits and costs of climate stabilization actions, the analysis concludes that programs of domestic and international climate actions will be hopelessly stymied by the failure of the actions to pass individual and collective rationality tests. However, these dire findings leave the door open to the possibility that some other change in circumstances might undercut this conclusion. In particular, the assignment of rights has that potential. Indeed, these circumstances echo the canonical insights from Ron Coase’s observation in The Problem of Social Cost (1960) that the arrangement of rights can have large effects on welfare when transaction costs for an externality are high. Current climate rights amount to a de facto open access right to pollute the atmosphere. Were a right to a stable climate for both for current and future generations recognized, added weight or leverage would add potency to support for climate stabilization policies and international agreements. These legal changes could represent a counterweight to offset the inadequacy of support from the current self-interested generation. Indeed, some recent climate litigation argues that many nations’ constitutions already encompass an affirmative right to a stable climate, a proposition that could represent a powerful means to break the climate impasse.
气候变化和社会成本问题
本文从积极和规范的经济角度评估了气候稳定的前景,并着眼于在国内、国际和代际这三个领域采取集体行动所需的条件。虽然众所周知,国际搭便车和交易成本是成功达成环境协议的主要障碍,但本分析指出,代际领域是棘手的根源,因为在承担缓解成本和享受其最终气候效益之间存在长期拖延。这种滞后导致中年选民的净收益在他们预期的剩余寿命期间为负。根据对气候稳定行动的效益和成本的几个综合评估模型,分析得出结论,如果这些行动未能通过个人和集体的理性检验,国内和国际气候行动计划将无可避免地受到阻碍。然而,这些可怕的发现为其他一些环境变化可能削弱这一结论的可能性敞开了大门。特别是,权利的转让具有这种潜力。事实上,这些情况与罗恩·科斯在《社会成本问题》(1960)中观察到的权威见解相呼应,即当外部性的交易成本很高时,权利的安排会对福利产生巨大影响。目前的气候权实际上相当于污染大气的开放使用权。如果当代人和子孙后代都享有稳定气候的权利得到承认,那么增加权重或杠杆作用将增加支持气候稳定政策和国际协议的效力。这些法律上的变化可以作为一种平衡,以抵消当前自私自利的一代人的支持不足。事实上,最近的一些气候诉讼认为,许多国家的宪法已经包含了稳定气候的肯定权利,这一主张可能是打破气候僵局的有力手段。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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