Moral Agency Conditions: Moral Agent, Limited Moral Agent, Quasi-Moral Agent

S. V. Glebova, N. V. Perova
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Abstract

Introduction . The concept of “moral agent” and its boundaries are not currently clearly defined. Given the connection between moral agency and moral responsibility, it seems necessary to introduce a clear definition of “moral agent”, as well as to differentiate the types of moral agency. The hypothesis of this article is that although the notion of a moral agent in itself is rather limited, there are a number of “borderline” groups, the definition of the status of which needs to be clarified. Methodology and sources . The article provides an ethical and philosophical analysis of approaches to the definition of a moral agency, a comparative analysis of the concepts of a moral agent and a moral subject, as well as approaches to determining the moral statuses of various “borderline” groups in the context of the works of J. MacMurray, A. Taylor, I. Kant, M Rowlands, J. Searle and others. Results and discussion . The article presents an analysis of the definitions of a “moral agent”, highlights the key features that make it possible to speak of a moral agency as an independent moral concept, as well as determine the conditions for the onset of moral agency. To differentiate the types of moral agents, the article introduces the concept of “limited moral agent” to denote the special status of children and the mentally ill. Evidence is provided that people belonging to these categories may have the status of a moral agent, although not to the extent that this status initially implies. As part of the definition of artificial intelligence as a “quasi-moral agent”, the key features of AI in the framework of moral communication between AI and a person are identified. Conclusion . Based on the analysis, the article proposes a number of requirements for a moral agency. Based on these requirements, it is proposed to distinguish such types of moral agency as a limited moral agent, including children and the mentally ill, as well as a quasi-moral agent, which is an artificially created agent, including artificial intelligence.
道德代理条件:道德代理、有限道德代理、准道德代理
介绍。“道德行为人”的概念及其界限目前还没有明确界定。鉴于道德代理与道德责任之间的联系,有必要对“道德代理”进行明确的定义,并对道德代理的类型进行区分。本文的假设是,尽管道德行为人的概念本身是相当有限的,但有一些“边缘”群体,其地位的定义需要澄清。方法和来源。本文在J.麦克默里、a .泰勒、I.康德、M .罗兰兹、J.塞尔等人的著作背景下,对道德能动者的定义方法进行了伦理和哲学分析,对道德能动者和道德主体的概念进行了比较分析,并对确定各种“边缘”群体的道德地位的方法进行了分析。结果和讨论。本文对“道德行为人”的定义进行了分析,强调了使道德行为人作为一个独立的道德概念来谈论成为可能的关键特征,并确定了道德行为人产生的条件。为了区分道德主体的类型,本文引入了“有限道德主体”的概念来表示儿童和精神病患者的特殊地位。有证据表明,属于这些类别的人可能具有道德行动者的地位,尽管没有达到这种地位最初所暗示的程度。作为将人工智能定义为“准道德主体”的一部分,本文在人工智能与人之间的道德交流框架中确定了人工智能的关键特征。结论。在此基础上,提出了道德代理的若干要求。基于这些要求,提出将道德代理区分为有限道德代理,包括儿童和精神病患者,以及准道德代理,即人工创造的代理,包括人工智能。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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