Market power in California's water market

IF 4.2 2区经济学 Q1 AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS & POLICY

American Journal of Agricultural Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-28 DOI:10.1111/ajae.12434

Françeska Tomori, Erik Ansink, Harold Houba, Nick Hagerty, Charles Bos

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We estimate market power in California's surface water market. Market power may distort the potential welfare gains from water marketing. We use a Nash-Cournot model and derive a closed-form solution for the extent of market power in a water market setting. We then use this solution to estimate market power in a newly assembled dataset on California's water economy. We show that, under the assumptions of the Nash-Cournot model, market power in this thin market is limited.

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加州水市场的市场力量

我们估算了加利福尼亚州地表水市场的市场支配力。市场支配力可能会扭曲水市场营销的潜在福利收益。我们使用纳什-库诺模型，得出了水市场环境中市场支配力程度的闭式解。然后，我们利用该解决方案估算了新收集的加利福尼亚州水经济数据集中的市场力量。我们表明，在纳什-库诺模型的假设条件下，这个单薄市场的市场支配力是有限的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

American Journal of Agricultural Economics 管理科学-农业经济与政策

CiteScore

9.10

自引率

4.80%

发文量

审稿时长

12-24 weeks

期刊介绍： The American Journal of Agricultural Economics provides a forum for creative and scholarly work on the economics of agriculture and food, natural resources and the environment, and rural and community development throughout the world. Papers should relate to one of these areas, should have a problem orientation, and should demonstrate originality and innovation in analysis, methods, or application. Analyses of problems pertinent to research, extension, and teaching are equally encouraged, as is interdisciplinary research with a significant economic component. Review articles that offer a comprehensive and insightful survey of a relevant subject, consistent with the scope of the Journal as discussed above, will also be considered. All articles published, regardless of their nature, will be held to the same set of scholarly standards.