{"title":"Managing material shortages in project supply chains: Inventories, time buffers, and supplier flexibility","authors":"Panos Kouvelis, Xingxing Chen, Yu Xia","doi":"10.1111/poms.14059","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We consider a two‐stage project supply chain with a downstream project firm producing an engineer‐to‐order (ETO) complex product or a make‐to‐order (MTO), low‐volume, customized industrial product as a project, and an upstream contract supplier supplying a key material to the project. The project faces two uncertainties: project activity time uncertainty and material consumption uncertainty, which may be positively or negatively correlated. In anticipation of these uncertainties, the project firm has to carefully decide its promised project due date to its project customer, against which harsh penalties will be assessed, and his material order quantity to commit to the contract supplier in advance. In most practical settings, project firms order from contracted suppliers via a flexible wholesale price contract consisting of a discounted advance order price and a risk‐premium adjusted expedite order price. The discounted advance order price encourages the project firm to take more inventory risk in the supply chain, and the expedite order price incentivizes the supplier to bear more inventory risk by carrying safety stock in excess of the project firm's advance material order. We formulate an optimization model that solves the project firm's project due date and material order problem, which takes into account the supplier's strategic reaction to the project firm's material order under the flexible wholesale price contract. We show that for MTO projects, risk‐sharing with suppliers on project materials is less important to the project firm, with the project firm assuming ownership of all material inventory in the channel and setting a deliberate project due date being the key. On the other hand, for ETO projects, risk‐sharing with contracted suppliers assumes critical importance. Project firms managing ETO projects should fully exploit the flexibility in the material supply contract to optimally drive the supplier's safety stock level and set the project due date reflecting the shared risk in the supply chain.","PeriodicalId":20623,"journal":{"name":"Production and Operations Management","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":4.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Production and Operations Management","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.14059","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ENGINEERING, MANUFACTURING","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Abstract We consider a two‐stage project supply chain with a downstream project firm producing an engineer‐to‐order (ETO) complex product or a make‐to‐order (MTO), low‐volume, customized industrial product as a project, and an upstream contract supplier supplying a key material to the project. The project faces two uncertainties: project activity time uncertainty and material consumption uncertainty, which may be positively or negatively correlated. In anticipation of these uncertainties, the project firm has to carefully decide its promised project due date to its project customer, against which harsh penalties will be assessed, and his material order quantity to commit to the contract supplier in advance. In most practical settings, project firms order from contracted suppliers via a flexible wholesale price contract consisting of a discounted advance order price and a risk‐premium adjusted expedite order price. The discounted advance order price encourages the project firm to take more inventory risk in the supply chain, and the expedite order price incentivizes the supplier to bear more inventory risk by carrying safety stock in excess of the project firm's advance material order. We formulate an optimization model that solves the project firm's project due date and material order problem, which takes into account the supplier's strategic reaction to the project firm's material order under the flexible wholesale price contract. We show that for MTO projects, risk‐sharing with suppliers on project materials is less important to the project firm, with the project firm assuming ownership of all material inventory in the channel and setting a deliberate project due date being the key. On the other hand, for ETO projects, risk‐sharing with contracted suppliers assumes critical importance. Project firms managing ETO projects should fully exploit the flexibility in the material supply contract to optimally drive the supplier's safety stock level and set the project due date reflecting the shared risk in the supply chain.
期刊介绍:
The mission of Production and Operations Management is to serve as the flagship research journal in operations management in manufacturing and services. The journal publishes scientific research into the problems, interest, and concerns of managers who manage product and process design, operations, and supply chains. It covers all topics in product and process design, operations, and supply chain management and welcomes papers using any research paradigm.