In the CEO We Trust: Negative Effects of Trust between the Board and the CEO

IF 3.9 2区 经济学 Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Kee-Hong Bae, Sadok El Ghoul, Zhaoran (Jason) Gong, Omrane Guedhami
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract In this study, we investigate whether and how trust between board members and the CEO (board–CEO trust) affects the performance of mergers and acquisitions. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that firms with higher levels of board–CEO trust exhibit poor M&A performance. High trust is associated with low acquisition announcement returns, long-term stock return performance, and post-deal operating performance. This negative effect of board–CEO trust is more pronounced among acquiring companies prone to agency problems. Our results suggest that, in the institutional setting of corporate boards, high trust can be too much of a good thing.
《我们信任的CEO:董事会与CEO之间信任的负面影响
摘要本文研究董事会成员与CEO之间的信任(board - CEO trust)是否影响企业并购绩效,以及如何影响企业并购绩效。与传统观点相反,我们发现董事会- ceo信任程度较高的公司表现出较差的并购绩效。高信任与低收购公告回报、长期股票回报绩效和交易后运营绩效相关。这种董事会- ceo信任的负面影响在容易出现代理问题的收购公司中更为明显。我们的研究结果表明,在公司董事会的制度设置中,高度信任可能是一件好事。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.60
自引率
5.10%
发文量
131
期刊介绍: The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (JFQA) publishes theoretical and empirical research in financial economics. Topics include corporate finance, investments, capital and security markets, and quantitative methods of particular relevance to financial researchers. With a circulation of 3000 libraries, firms, and individuals in 70 nations, the JFQA serves an international community of sophisticated finance scholars—academics and practitioners alike. The JFQA prints less than 10% of the more than 600 unsolicited manuscripts submitted annually. An intensive blind review process and exacting editorial standards contribute to the JFQA’s reputation as a top finance journal.
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