Why reasons and reasoning don’t come apart

IF 1.3 1区哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Synthese Pub Date : 2023-11-02 DOI:10.1007/s11229-023-04355-4

Christian Kietzmann

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract In recent years several philosophers have proposed what has come to be called the Reasoning View of normative reasons, according to which normative reasons are premises of sound reasoning. The reasoning view has come under some criticism, which chiefly consists in counterexamples that purport to show that something can be a premise of sound reasoning without intuitively being a normative reason, or can be a normative reason without being a premise of sound reasoning. I here consider and reject three examples that were recently put forward. Discussing them will allow me to clarify the Reasoning View in important respects.

查看原文本刊更多论文

为什么理由和推理不能分开

近年来，一些哲学家提出了所谓的规范性理性的推理观，根据这种观点，规范性理性是健全推理的前提。推理观点受到了一些批评，这些批评主要是由反例构成的，反例旨在表明，某些东西可以是合理推理的前提，而不是直观的规范性理性，或者可以是规范性理性，而不是合理推理的前提。我在此考虑并反对最近提出的三个例子。讨论它们将使我能够在重要方面澄清推理观。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

Synthese 管理科学-科学史与科学哲学

CiteScore

3.30

自引率

13.30%

发文量

471

审稿时长

1 months

期刊介绍： Synthese is a philosophy journal focusing on contemporary issues in epistemology, philosophy of science, and related fields. More specifically, we divide our areas of interest into four groups: (1) epistemology, methodology, and philosophy of science, all broadly understood. (2) The foundations of logic and mathematics, where ‘logic’, ‘mathematics’, and ‘foundations’ are all broadly understood. (3) Formal methods in philosophy, including methods connecting philosophy to other academic fields. (4) Issues in ethics and the history and sociology of logic, mathematics, and science that contribute to the contemporary studies Synthese focuses on, as described in (1)-(3) above.