The perks of being in the smaller team: incentives in overlapping contests

IF 0.3 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Review of Economic Design Pub Date : 2023-06-24 DOI:10.1007/s10058-023-00331-z

Christoph March, Marco Sahm

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract We investigate overlapping contests in multi-divisional organizations in which an individual’s effort simultaneously determines the outcome of several contests on different hierarchical levels. We show that individuals in smaller units are advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for two reasons: First, the incentive to free-ride is smaller in inter-divisional contests. Second, competition in the intra-divisional contest is less fierce. Both effects induce a higher marginal utility of effort provision. We test the model in a laboratory experiment and confirm its main predictions. Our results have important consequences for the provision of incentives in organizations and the design of sports competitions.

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小团队的好处:重叠竞赛的激励

摘要本文研究了多部门组织中的重叠竞争，在这种竞争中，个体的努力同时决定了不同层次上多个竞争的结果。我们发现，小单位的个体在大的(组织范围的)竞争中具有优势，原因有二:首先，在部门间的竞争中，搭便车的动机较小。第二，赛区内的竞争不那么激烈。这两种效应都会导致付出的边际效用更高。我们在实验室实验中对该模型进行了测试，并证实了其主要预测。我们的研究结果对组织激励的提供和体育竞赛的设计有重要的影响。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Review of Economic Design ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

28.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： Review of Economic Design comprises the creative art and science of inventing, analyzing and testing economic as well as social and political institutions and mechanisms aimed at achieving individual objectives and social goals. In this age of Economic Design, the accumulated traditions and wealth of knowledge in normative and positive economics and the strategic analysis of game theory are applied with novel ideas in the creative tasks of designing and assembling diverse legal-economic instruments. These include constitutions and other assignments of rights, mechanisms for allocation or regulation, tax and incentive schemes, contract forms, voting and other choice aggregation procedures, markets, auctions, organizational forms, such as partnerships, together with supporting membership and other property rights, and information systems. These designs, the methods of analysis used in their scrutiny, as well as the mathematical techniques and empirical knowledge they employ, along with comparative assessments of the performance of known economic systems and implemented designs, all of these form natural components of the subject matter of Economic Design. Officially cited as: Rev Econ Design