{"title":"Kant on the Normativity of Obligatory Ends","authors":"Martin Sticker","doi":"10.1007/s10892-023-09463-4","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I propose a novel way to understand the stringency of Kant’s conception of beneficence. This novel understanding can ground our intuition that we do not have to forego (almost) all pursuit of our personal ends. I argue that we should understand the application of imperfect duties to specific cases according to the framework set by the adoption and promotion of ends. Agents have other ends than obligatory ones and they must weigh obligatory ends against these other ends. Obligatory ends are special among ends only insofar as their adoption is not optional. My reading of the normative status of imperfect duties affords a way of thinking about beneficence modelled on the everyday ways in which agents pursue their personal projects and weigh different ends against each other. This establishes a middle-ground between an extremely demanding conception of beneficence and an overly latitudinarian one. Furthermore, it helps us understand why we do not have to be maximally beneficent and why there is a bias towards the near in our thinking about rescue cases.","PeriodicalId":35843,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Ethics","volume":"37 16","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Ethics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-023-09463-4","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Abstract I propose a novel way to understand the stringency of Kant’s conception of beneficence. This novel understanding can ground our intuition that we do not have to forego (almost) all pursuit of our personal ends. I argue that we should understand the application of imperfect duties to specific cases according to the framework set by the adoption and promotion of ends. Agents have other ends than obligatory ones and they must weigh obligatory ends against these other ends. Obligatory ends are special among ends only insofar as their adoption is not optional. My reading of the normative status of imperfect duties affords a way of thinking about beneficence modelled on the everyday ways in which agents pursue their personal projects and weigh different ends against each other. This establishes a middle-ground between an extremely demanding conception of beneficence and an overly latitudinarian one. Furthermore, it helps us understand why we do not have to be maximally beneficent and why there is a bias towards the near in our thinking about rescue cases.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Ethics: An International Philosophical Review seeks to publish articles on a wide range of topics in ethics, philosophically construed, including such areas as ethical theory, social, political, and legal philosophy, applied ethics, meta-ethics, the metaphysics of morality, and the history of ethics. The Journal of Ethics publishes work from a wide variety of styles including but not limited to the analytic tradition and hermeneutics. The Journal of Ethics is also interested in ethical thinking that is enriched by psychology, sociology and other empirical disciplines. The Journal of Ethics is primarily an organ of philosophical research, although it publishes work on topics of concern to academics and professionals alike. The journal also seeks to publish the highest quality commentaries on works published in its pages. Its double-blind review process must ensure analytical acuity as well as depth and range of philosophical scholarship.
At the moment, the journal does not publish book reviews.