{"title":"Mandatory retirement savings in the presence of an informal labor market","authors":"Oliver Pardo","doi":"10.1007/s00148-023-00967-9","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper shows how mandating workers to save more for retirement can lead them to work informally and save less. Consider a worker who is more productive in the formal sector but works informally to avoid mandatory retirement contributions. Lowering the contribution rate (the share of wages mandated to be saved) will paradoxically increase her retirement savings. The reason for this is that working informally acts as borrowing against mandatory savings. The implicit cost of such borrowing, and hence the opportunity cost of working informally, rises as the contribution rate drops. This creates a substitution effect favoring formal work, driving the worker towards the formal sector. As her formal income increases, the base for her mandatory contributions rises, expanding her retirement savings. Therefore, the optimal contribution rate is no greater than the highest contribution rate under which the worker prefers to work exclusively in the formal sector.","PeriodicalId":48013,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Population Economics","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":6.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Population Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-023-00967-9","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Abstract This paper shows how mandating workers to save more for retirement can lead them to work informally and save less. Consider a worker who is more productive in the formal sector but works informally to avoid mandatory retirement contributions. Lowering the contribution rate (the share of wages mandated to be saved) will paradoxically increase her retirement savings. The reason for this is that working informally acts as borrowing against mandatory savings. The implicit cost of such borrowing, and hence the opportunity cost of working informally, rises as the contribution rate drops. This creates a substitution effect favoring formal work, driving the worker towards the formal sector. As her formal income increases, the base for her mandatory contributions rises, expanding her retirement savings. Therefore, the optimal contribution rate is no greater than the highest contribution rate under which the worker prefers to work exclusively in the formal sector.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Population Economics is an international quarterly that publishes original theoretical and applied research in all areas of population economics.
Micro-level topics examine individual, household or family behavior, including household formation, marriage, divorce, fertility choices, education, labor supply, migration, health, risky behavior and aging. Macro-level investigations may address such issues as economic growth with exogenous or endogenous population evolution, population policy, savings and pensions, social security, housing, and health care.
The journal also features research into economic approaches to human biology, the relationship between population dynamics and public choice, and the impact of population on the distribution of income and wealth. Lastly, readers will find papers dealing with policy issues and development problems that are relevant to population issues.The journal is published in collaboration with POP at UNU-MERIT, the Global Labor Organization (GLO) and the European Society for Population Economics (ESPE).Officially cited as: J Popul Econ Factor (RePEc): 13.576 (July 2018) Rank 69 of 2102 journals listed in RePEc