The Experience of Affordances in an Intersubjective World

IF 1.3 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Julian Kiverstein, Giuseppe Flavio Artese
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Abstract

Abstract Our paper is concerned with theories of direct perception in ecological psychology that first emerged in the second half of the twentieth century. Ecological psychology continues to be influential among philosophers and cognitive scientists today who defend a 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) approach to the scientific study of cognition. Ecological psychologists have experimentally investigated how animals are able to directly perceive their surrounding environment and what it affords to them. We pursue questions about direct perception through a discussion of the ecological psychologist’s concept of affordances. In recent years, psychologists and philosophers have begun to mark out two explanatory roles for the affordance concept. In one role, affordances are cast as belonging to a shared, publicly available environment, and existing independent of the experience of any perceiving and acting animal. In a second role, affordances are described in phenomenological terms, in relation to an experiencing animal that has its own peculiar needs, interests and personal history. Our aim in this paper is to argue for a single phenomenological or experiential understanding of the affordance concept. We make our argument, first of all, based on William James’ concept of pure experience developed in his later, radical empiricist writings. James thought of pure experience as having a field structure that is organized by the selective interest and needs of the perceiver. We will argue however that James did not emphasize sufficiently the social and intersubjective character of the field of experience. Drawing on the phenomenologist Aron Gurwitsch, we will argue that psychological factors like individual needs and attention must be thought of as already confronted with a social reality. On the phenomenological reading of affordances we develop, direct perception of affordances is understood as taking place within an intersubjective world structured by human social and cultural life.
主体间性世界中的可视性体验
摘要本文主要研究二十世纪下半叶兴起的生态心理学中的直接知觉理论。生态心理学在今天的哲学家和认知科学家中继续具有影响力,他们捍卫4E(具体化,嵌入,扩展,行动)方法来进行科学的认知研究。生态心理学家通过实验研究了动物是如何直接感知周围环境的,以及周围环境给它们提供了什么。我们通过讨论生态心理学家的启示概念来探讨关于直接感知的问题。近年来,心理学家和哲学家开始为可视性概念指明两种解释作用。在一个角色中,可视性被视为属于一个共享的、公开可用的环境,并且独立于任何感知和行为动物的经验而存在。在第二个角色中,启示是用现象学术语来描述的,与有自己特殊需求、兴趣和个人历史的体验动物有关。我们在这篇论文中的目的是为了论证一个单一的现象学的或经验的对提供性概念的理解。首先,我们的论点是基于威廉·詹姆斯的纯粹经验概念,这是他后来的激进经验主义著作中发展起来的。詹姆斯认为纯粹的经验有一个场域结构,是由感知者的选择性兴趣和需求组织起来的。然而,我们会认为,詹姆斯没有充分强调经验领域的社会和主体间性特征。借鉴现象学家Aron Gurwitsch的观点,我们将论证,像个人需求和注意力这样的心理因素必须被认为已经面对了社会现实。从现象学的角度解读我们所发展的启示,启示的直接感知被理解为发生在一个由人类社会和文化生活构成的主体间世界中。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.10
自引率
7.10%
发文量
47
期刊介绍: Topoi''s main assumption is that philosophy is a lively, provocative, delightful activity, which constantly challenges our received views, relentlessly questions our inherited habits, painstakingly elaborates on how things could be different, in other stories, in counterfactual situations, in alternative possible worlds. Whatever its ideology, whether with the intent of uncovering a truer structure of reality or of soothing our anxiety, of exposing myths or of following them through, the outcome of philosophical activity is always the destabilizing, unsettling generation of doubts, of objections, of criticisms. It follows that this activity is intrinsically a ''dialogue'', that philosophy is first and foremost philosophical discussion, that it requires bringing out conflicting points of view, paying careful, sympathetic attention to their structure, and using this dialectic to articulate one''s approach, to make it richer, more thoughtful, more open to variation and play. And it follows that the spirit which one brings to this activity must be one of tolerance, of always suspecting one''s own blindness and consequently looking with unbiased eye in every corner, without fearing to pass a (fallible) judgment on what is there but also without failing to show interest and respect. Topoi''s structure is a direct expression of this view. To maximize discussion, we devote most or all of this issue to a single topic. And, since discussion is only interesting when it is conducted seriously and responsibly, we usually request the collaboration of a guest-editor, an expert who will identify contributors and interact with them in a constructive way. Because we do not feel tied to any definite philosophical theme (or set of them), we choose the topic with absolute freedom, looking for what is blossoming and thriving, occasionally betting on what might - partly through our attention - ''begin'' to blossom and thrive. And because we do not want our structur e to become our own straightjacket, we are open to contributions not fitting the ''topos'', and do not rule out in principle the possibility of topic-less issues.
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