Short-sale constraints and firm investment efficiency: Evidence from a natural experiment

IF 3.3 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107149

Zhihong Chen , Siwen Fu , Ke Wang

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We examine the causal effect of relaxing short-sale constraints on firm investment efficiency using the experiment of the SEC Regulation SHO pilot program. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find significant treatment effects of the pilot program on mitigating both underinvestment and overinvestment during the pilot period. These treatment effects disappear after the end of the pilot program. The effect on mitigating underinvestment is stronger for firms with severe financial constraints before the pilot period. The pilot program mitigates underinvestment and alleviates financing constraints more for pilot firms that experienced greater improvement in price efficiency after the pilot program began. The effect of the pilot program on mitigating overinvestment is more pronounced for firms with weaker governance and firms with more severe agency problems before the pilot period. These results suggest that relaxing short-sale constraints mitigates underinvestment through the external financing channel by improving price efficiency that alleviate financial constraints; and mitigates overinvestment through the managerial incentive channel by strengthening the disciplinary role of short sellers that enhances managers’ incentives to take correct actions.

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卖空约束与企业投资效率:来自自然实验的证据

我们使用SEC监管SHO试点项目的实验来检验放松卖空限制对企业投资效率的因果效应。采用差异中差异方法，我们发现试点项目在缓解试点期间的投资不足和过度投资方面都有显著的治疗效果。这些治疗效果在试点项目结束后消失。对于在试点阶段之前有严重财务限制的公司来说，缓解投资不足的效果更强。试点项目缓解了投资不足的问题，并更多地缓解了试点公司的融资约束，这些公司在试点项目开始后价格效率得到了更大的改善。对于治理较弱的企业和试点前代理问题较严重的企业，试点对缓解过度投资的效果更为明显。这些结果表明，放松短售房限制通过提高价格效率缓解了资金约束，从而通过外部融资渠道缓解了投资不足;通过加强卖空者的惩戒作用，增强管理者采取正确行动的激励，通过管理层激励渠道缓解过度投资。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Multiple-

CiteScore

4.80

自引率

2.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Accounting and Public Policy publishes research papers focusing on the intersection between accounting and public policy. Preference is given to papers illuminating through theoretical or empirical analysis, the effects of accounting on public policy and vice-versa. Subjects treated in this journal include the interface of accounting with economics, political science, sociology, or law. The Journal includes a section entitled Accounting Letters. This section publishes short research articles that should not exceed approximately 3,000 words. The objective of this section is to facilitate the rapid dissemination of important accounting research. Accordingly, articles submitted to this section will be reviewed within fours weeks of receipt, revisions will be limited to one, and publication will occur within four months of acceptance.