Signs of character: a signalling model of Hume’s theory of moral and immoral actions

IF 1.2 2区 哲学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Ahmer Tarar
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract In A Treatise of Human Nature , Hume argues that morality pertains primarily to character, and that actions have moral content only to the extent that they signal good or bad character. I formalize his signalling theory of moral/immoral actions using simple game-theoretic models. Conditions exist under which there is a separating equilibrium in which actions do indeed credibly signal character, but conditions also exist in which there is only a pooling or semi-separating equilibrium. A tradeoff is identified between the signalling value of actions, and the consequentialist goal of incentivizing all character types to choose beneficial actions.
性格标志:休谟道德与不道德行为理论的信号模型
在《人性论》一书中,休谟认为道德主要与性格有关,行为只有在表现出好或坏的性格时才具有道德内容。我用简单的博弈论模型形式化了他关于道德/不道德行为的信号理论。存在这样的条件,即存在分离均衡,在这种情况下,行为确实可靠地表明了特征,但也存在只有池化或半分离均衡的条件。在行动的信号价值和激励所有角色类型选择有益行动的结果主义目标之间,存在一种权衡。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.80
自引率
8.30%
发文量
30
期刊介绍: The disciplines of economics and philosophy each possess their own special analytical methods, whose combination is powerful and fruitful. Each discipline can be enriched by the other. Economics and Philosophy aims to promote their mutual enrichment by publishing articles and book reviews in all areas linking these subjects. Topics include the methodology and epistemology of economics, the foundations of decision theory and game theory, the nature of rational choice in general, historical work on economics with a philosophical purpose, ethical issues in economics, the use of economic techniques in ethical theory, and many other subjects.
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