The over-education wage penalty among PhD holders: a European perspective

IF 1.2 Q3 Social Sciences
Loredana Cultrera, François Rycx, Giulia Santosuosso, Guillaume Vermeylen
{"title":"The over-education wage penalty among PhD holders: a European perspective","authors":"Loredana Cultrera, François Rycx, Giulia Santosuosso, Guillaume Vermeylen","doi":"10.1080/09645292.2023.2277120","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTUsing a unique pan-European dataset, we rely on two alternative measures of over-education and control stepwise for four groups of covariates in order to interpret the over-education wage penalty in light of theoretical models. Firstly, it appears that a significant fraction (i.e. between 1/5 and 1/3) of PhD holders in Europe are genuinely over-educated. Secondly, these genuinely over-educated PhD holders are found to face a substantial wage penalty (ranging from 15 to almost 30%) with respect to their well-matched counterparts. Finally, unconditional quantile regressions highlight that the over-education wage penalty among PhD holders increases greatly along the wage distribution.KEYWORDS: Phd graduatesover-educationover-skillingjob satisfactionwagesEuropeJEL CODES: J21J24 Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 In the European Union, the statistics point in the same direction: the number of newly enrolled doctoral students aged between 24 and 35 increased by almost 27% between 2013 and 2018 (from around 71,000 to almost 90,000), while the number of doctoral students rose from around 735,000 to 779,000 between 2013 and 2019 (European Commission Citation2020; Eurostat, Citation2023). Furthermore, in 2019, the number of new doctorate holders was around 121,000 in the EU-28 (Eurostat, Citation2023).2 This said, it should be noted that a significant number of people embark on a thesis for reasons other than obtaining a job requiring a PhD. Intrinsic motivation and intellectual development are also important drivers (Hnatkova et al. Citation2022). In addition, studies show that many PhD graduates, despite holding jobs for which a PhD is not essential (and for which they are therefore likely to be over-educated), can nevertheless leverage their degree to improve their career prospects. More specifically, as Boman et al. (Citation2021) point out, in many jobs, a doctorate, even if not required, is desired or valued, so that the person with a doctorate has a more interesting and rewarding job, which also makes it easier to access more responsibility, promotion or other benefits (pecuniary or otherwise).3 The term ‘voluntary’ should be interpreted with caution as it may obviously be a constrained choice.4 The study by Ermini, Papi, and Scaturro (Citation2017), based on four cohorts of Italian doctoral graduates (relating to the years 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010), also finds that jobs held by doctoral graduates in academia and the research sector are more often associated with a successful match. The analysis by Boman et al. (Citation2021), which is based on a career tracking survey of doctoral graduates between 2006 and 2020 in nine European universities, concludes that almost half of doctoral graduates are employed in jobs that do not require a doctorate, but also that overeducation is most prevalent outside universities and research institutions.5 By relying on the WA method, over-education is constructed with replies from questions concerning the usefulness of the PhD. In this regards, it has been underlined how the exact phrasing varies substantially across studies: some interviews refer to recruiting standards (Duncan and Hoffman Citation1981), while others to the education needed to perform the job (Hartog and Oosterbeek Citation1988). Evidence also shows that the same person responds differently to similar questions, and it is not clear whether and to what extent these variations in framing and phrasing cause differences in the measured levels of required education (Green, Myerson, and Ostaszewski Citation1999). For these reasons, we calculated the over-education variable in two alternative ways, namely on the basis of the usefulness of the PhD title to do and to get the current job position respectively.6 The over-education variable computed on the basis of the educational level to get the job is used as a robustness test. Estimates based on this alternative measure are very similar to those based on the educational level required to do the job. Therefore, the latter are only reported for the stepwise OLS analysis (without interaction effects). The results of other specifications, which corroborate our findings, are available on request.7 To calculate the gross hourly wage, we first converted the variable Q50_X, i.e. the ‘gross monthly earnings’ of workers in the various countries analysed, into a common currency, namely the euro. To do this, we use the average exchange rate between national currencies and the euro in 2014. Next, we calculated the number of hours worked per month by multiplying the ‘hours worked per week’ (i.e. variable Q10_2) by 4.43 (as it is generally accepted that a month comprises an average of 4.33 weeks). Finally, by dividing the gross monthly wage (expressed in euros) by the hours worked per month, we obtain the gross hourly wage.8 A worker is considered as under-educated if her/his level of education is lower than that required for her/his job.9 Given the distribution of these variables, we have chosen to include 2 dummies for ICT skills (i.e. for moderate and advanced levels) and only 1 for numeracy and literacy skills respectively (i.e. for the advanced level).10 This fourth group of variables refers to the career aspirations of employees before they started working for their current employer. In practice, it turns out that for many of these employees, these aspirations are not, or are no longer, being met. This is particularly the case if we focus on the desire of certain employees to have a job that corresponds to their qualifications. Indeed, when we calculate the correlation between this variable and the overeducation variable (our variable of interest), we find that it is very weak (equal to -0.04) and therefore that there is no systematic relationship between these two variables.11 The European Skills and Jobs Survey relies on a quota approach. Quota sampling can achieve representativeness by using quotas and weights which align the sample with the population on key variables. This method ensures that the sample is representative for the key control variables and makes it likely for other variables that correlate with them. Consequently, we have used weights in our analysis. Specifically, we relied on variable 291 (i.e. ‘Weight_Country_with_education’). For more details, see Ipsos MORI (Citation2014).12 Specifically, we excluded from our analysis individuals who answered ‘no’ to the following question from the ESJS: ‘Did you do any paid work in the last 7 days, even if it was for one hour?’.13 To examine whether over-education among PhD holders is a temporary phenomenon (i.e. whether it occurs more often just after the doctorate is obtained), we calculated the incidence of over-education according to the year in which doctoral graduates obtained their degree. We considered different thresholds. In all cases, the incidence remains very stable, close to its mean value. Our estimates (available on request) therefore suggest that over-education among PhD holders is fairly persistent and stable across cohorts of PhD holders.14 We also examined the incidence of over-education, as well as the distribution of PhD graduates, by sector, occupation and field of study. Descriptive statistics presented in Appendix Table A-3 show that 46% of doctorate holders work in the private sector and that their probability of being over-educated there is 87%, i.e. 14% points higher than in the public sector (including other organisations, such as not-for-profit trusts, charities and non-governmental organisations). Furthermore, we note that almost all doctorate holders are either managers (11%), professionals (56%), technicians and associate professionals (15%) or clerical support workers (13%). In these occupations, the incidence of over-education varies from 70% (among professionals) to 96% (among clerical support workers). As for the breakdown of doctorate holders by field of study, we find that 22% of them hold degrees in Economics, business, law and finance, 15% respectively in Natural sciences and Engineering sciences, 14% in Humanities, languages and arts, and 11% in Teacher training and education science. Other fields of study (e.g. Computer sciences or Medecine and health-related sciences) gather less than 10% of PhD holders in our sample. Finally, as regards the incidence of over-education among doctoral graduates by field of study, it fluctuates between 49% for graduates in Medecine and health-related sciences and 88% for graduates in Humanities, languages and arts.15 The severity of over-education has also been investigated. Therefore, we classified over-educated PhD holders in three categories according to the degree required to do their jobs. We have qualified over-education as ‘mild’ when the level of education required for the job corresponds to ISCED 5 (i.e. tertiary education – first level), ‘severe’ when it corresponds to ISCED 3 or 4 (i.e. upper secondary education or pre-vocational post-secondary education), and ‘very severe’ when it corresponds to ISCED 1 or 2 (i.e. primary or lower secondary education at most). Unfortunately, when the level required to do a job corresponds to a tertiary diploma – first level (ISCED 5), our data do not allow us to have more details and in particular to identify whether it is a bachelor’s or a master’s degree that is needed. Clearly, having this additional information would have been a plus, as the consequences of over-education are probably most acute when only a bachelor's degree is required. Be that as it may, our results (available on request) show that in 80 to 86% of cases, depending on whether we consider our sample as a whole, the private or public sector, over-education can be described as mild, insofar as the PhD graduates actually do a job for which a tertiary degree is sufficient. Moreover, they suggest that the problem of over-education is somewhat less acute in the public sector than in the private sector. Indeed, while in the private sector over-education is severe or very severe for over 16% of over-educated PhDs, this is the case for less than 12% of over-educated PhDs in the public sector.16 The complete set of regression results, not reported here due to space constraints, is available on request.17 See Section 3.1 and Appendix Table A-2 for a detailed description of these characteristics.18 As a sensitivity test, we re-estimated our benchmark equation, including all covariates, separately for PhD holders working in the private sector (i.e. private companies and partnerships), the public sector (i.e. national, regional and local public organisations) and other organisations (i.e. not-for-profit trusts, charities, non-governmental organisations and other organisations) respectively. Our estimates, available on request, show that the wage penalty associated with over-education is greatest in the private sector (-23.2%), lower in the public sector (-16.2%) and not significant in other organisations. The lower penalty in the public sector is probably due to the fact that, in this this sector, wages are generally based on fairly precise job classifications, where seniority-based pay often continues to play an important role, with little or no scope for individual wage negotiation. Overall, this results in a relatively compressed wage distribution, where low-skilled workers tend to earn more than their private sector counterparts, while the reverse is true for high-skilled workers, and therefore also for PhD holders (Bargain and Melly Citation2008; Lucifora and Meurs Citation2006). In the private sector, on the other hand, salary dispersion is typically greater and highly qualified positions (which in some cases require a doctorate) are generally much better paid than in the public sector (Giordano et al. Citation2011). As the academic sector represents only a small proportion of total public employment, our results are not directly comparable with those of previous studies (e.g. Bender and Heywood Citation2009; Gaeta, Lavadera, and Pastore Citation2022) comparing wage penalties of over-educated PhD holders inside and outside academia.19 We also re-estimated our benchmark equation according to the severity of the over-education problem (e.g. qualified as mild, severe or very severe, see footnote 16 for the description of these categories). All sectors combined, our results (available on request) show that the wage penalty increases as the over-education problem worsens. The penalty is estimated at −24.9% and −34.5% in severe and very severe cases respectively. In mild cases, the penalty is not statistically significant. This non-significant outcome is likely to be at least partly driven by the fact that we are unable to distinguish PhD graduates in jobs requiring a bachelor’s degree from those in jobs requiring a master’s degree. Interestingly, though, if we turn to the estimates for the private sector, we find that the penalty is statistically significant and equal to −16.4% in mild cases and reaches −51.9% in more severe cases. In the public sector, the over-education wage penalty is estimated at −9.7 and −20.1% in mild and more severe cases respectively. However, none of these coefficients is statistically significant (again, probably because we can't distinguish between jobs requiring a bachelor’s or a master’s degree, but also because of a small sample issue, particularly for the more severe cases of over-education).20 The ORU (Over-, Required, and Under-education) approach, suggested by Duncan and Hoffman (Citation1981), enables to estimate the wage impact of over-education conditional on the level of education required to perform a job. The standard result from this literature is that over-educated workers earn a wage premium over their colleagues who do the same job but are adequately educated to do it (i.e. well-matched). In order to examine whether a similar result is obtained with our data, we re-estimated the over-education wage differential for doctoral graduates using an ORU approach. Our results, available on request, show that wages rise on average by 7.8% when the level of required education for a job increases by one year. Moreover, they indicate that a one-year increase in over-education among PhD holders improves wages by 3.9%. These estimates, as expected, suggest that over-educated PhD holders earn a wage premium over their well-matched colleagues. They are also in line with previous evidence showing that over-educated PhD holders can nevertheless take advantage of their degree to improve their career prospects (see e.g. Boman et al. (Citation2021)).21 See footnote 4.22 Detailed regression results, not reported here due to space constraints, are available on request.23 We thank an anonymous referee for making these valuable comments.","PeriodicalId":46682,"journal":{"name":"Education Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Education Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09645292.2023.2277120","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

ABSTRACTUsing a unique pan-European dataset, we rely on two alternative measures of over-education and control stepwise for four groups of covariates in order to interpret the over-education wage penalty in light of theoretical models. Firstly, it appears that a significant fraction (i.e. between 1/5 and 1/3) of PhD holders in Europe are genuinely over-educated. Secondly, these genuinely over-educated PhD holders are found to face a substantial wage penalty (ranging from 15 to almost 30%) with respect to their well-matched counterparts. Finally, unconditional quantile regressions highlight that the over-education wage penalty among PhD holders increases greatly along the wage distribution.KEYWORDS: Phd graduatesover-educationover-skillingjob satisfactionwagesEuropeJEL CODES: J21J24 Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 In the European Union, the statistics point in the same direction: the number of newly enrolled doctoral students aged between 24 and 35 increased by almost 27% between 2013 and 2018 (from around 71,000 to almost 90,000), while the number of doctoral students rose from around 735,000 to 779,000 between 2013 and 2019 (European Commission Citation2020; Eurostat, Citation2023). Furthermore, in 2019, the number of new doctorate holders was around 121,000 in the EU-28 (Eurostat, Citation2023).2 This said, it should be noted that a significant number of people embark on a thesis for reasons other than obtaining a job requiring a PhD. Intrinsic motivation and intellectual development are also important drivers (Hnatkova et al. Citation2022). In addition, studies show that many PhD graduates, despite holding jobs for which a PhD is not essential (and for which they are therefore likely to be over-educated), can nevertheless leverage their degree to improve their career prospects. More specifically, as Boman et al. (Citation2021) point out, in many jobs, a doctorate, even if not required, is desired or valued, so that the person with a doctorate has a more interesting and rewarding job, which also makes it easier to access more responsibility, promotion or other benefits (pecuniary or otherwise).3 The term ‘voluntary’ should be interpreted with caution as it may obviously be a constrained choice.4 The study by Ermini, Papi, and Scaturro (Citation2017), based on four cohorts of Italian doctoral graduates (relating to the years 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010), also finds that jobs held by doctoral graduates in academia and the research sector are more often associated with a successful match. The analysis by Boman et al. (Citation2021), which is based on a career tracking survey of doctoral graduates between 2006 and 2020 in nine European universities, concludes that almost half of doctoral graduates are employed in jobs that do not require a doctorate, but also that overeducation is most prevalent outside universities and research institutions.5 By relying on the WA method, over-education is constructed with replies from questions concerning the usefulness of the PhD. In this regards, it has been underlined how the exact phrasing varies substantially across studies: some interviews refer to recruiting standards (Duncan and Hoffman Citation1981), while others to the education needed to perform the job (Hartog and Oosterbeek Citation1988). Evidence also shows that the same person responds differently to similar questions, and it is not clear whether and to what extent these variations in framing and phrasing cause differences in the measured levels of required education (Green, Myerson, and Ostaszewski Citation1999). For these reasons, we calculated the over-education variable in two alternative ways, namely on the basis of the usefulness of the PhD title to do and to get the current job position respectively.6 The over-education variable computed on the basis of the educational level to get the job is used as a robustness test. Estimates based on this alternative measure are very similar to those based on the educational level required to do the job. Therefore, the latter are only reported for the stepwise OLS analysis (without interaction effects). The results of other specifications, which corroborate our findings, are available on request.7 To calculate the gross hourly wage, we first converted the variable Q50_X, i.e. the ‘gross monthly earnings’ of workers in the various countries analysed, into a common currency, namely the euro. To do this, we use the average exchange rate between national currencies and the euro in 2014. Next, we calculated the number of hours worked per month by multiplying the ‘hours worked per week’ (i.e. variable Q10_2) by 4.43 (as it is generally accepted that a month comprises an average of 4.33 weeks). Finally, by dividing the gross monthly wage (expressed in euros) by the hours worked per month, we obtain the gross hourly wage.8 A worker is considered as under-educated if her/his level of education is lower than that required for her/his job.9 Given the distribution of these variables, we have chosen to include 2 dummies for ICT skills (i.e. for moderate and advanced levels) and only 1 for numeracy and literacy skills respectively (i.e. for the advanced level).10 This fourth group of variables refers to the career aspirations of employees before they started working for their current employer. In practice, it turns out that for many of these employees, these aspirations are not, or are no longer, being met. This is particularly the case if we focus on the desire of certain employees to have a job that corresponds to their qualifications. Indeed, when we calculate the correlation between this variable and the overeducation variable (our variable of interest), we find that it is very weak (equal to -0.04) and therefore that there is no systematic relationship between these two variables.11 The European Skills and Jobs Survey relies on a quota approach. Quota sampling can achieve representativeness by using quotas and weights which align the sample with the population on key variables. This method ensures that the sample is representative for the key control variables and makes it likely for other variables that correlate with them. Consequently, we have used weights in our analysis. Specifically, we relied on variable 291 (i.e. ‘Weight_Country_with_education’). For more details, see Ipsos MORI (Citation2014).12 Specifically, we excluded from our analysis individuals who answered ‘no’ to the following question from the ESJS: ‘Did you do any paid work in the last 7 days, even if it was for one hour?’.13 To examine whether over-education among PhD holders is a temporary phenomenon (i.e. whether it occurs more often just after the doctorate is obtained), we calculated the incidence of over-education according to the year in which doctoral graduates obtained their degree. We considered different thresholds. In all cases, the incidence remains very stable, close to its mean value. Our estimates (available on request) therefore suggest that over-education among PhD holders is fairly persistent and stable across cohorts of PhD holders.14 We also examined the incidence of over-education, as well as the distribution of PhD graduates, by sector, occupation and field of study. Descriptive statistics presented in Appendix Table A-3 show that 46% of doctorate holders work in the private sector and that their probability of being over-educated there is 87%, i.e. 14% points higher than in the public sector (including other organisations, such as not-for-profit trusts, charities and non-governmental organisations). Furthermore, we note that almost all doctorate holders are either managers (11%), professionals (56%), technicians and associate professionals (15%) or clerical support workers (13%). In these occupations, the incidence of over-education varies from 70% (among professionals) to 96% (among clerical support workers). As for the breakdown of doctorate holders by field of study, we find that 22% of them hold degrees in Economics, business, law and finance, 15% respectively in Natural sciences and Engineering sciences, 14% in Humanities, languages and arts, and 11% in Teacher training and education science. Other fields of study (e.g. Computer sciences or Medecine and health-related sciences) gather less than 10% of PhD holders in our sample. Finally, as regards the incidence of over-education among doctoral graduates by field of study, it fluctuates between 49% for graduates in Medecine and health-related sciences and 88% for graduates in Humanities, languages and arts.15 The severity of over-education has also been investigated. Therefore, we classified over-educated PhD holders in three categories according to the degree required to do their jobs. We have qualified over-education as ‘mild’ when the level of education required for the job corresponds to ISCED 5 (i.e. tertiary education – first level), ‘severe’ when it corresponds to ISCED 3 or 4 (i.e. upper secondary education or pre-vocational post-secondary education), and ‘very severe’ when it corresponds to ISCED 1 or 2 (i.e. primary or lower secondary education at most). Unfortunately, when the level required to do a job corresponds to a tertiary diploma – first level (ISCED 5), our data do not allow us to have more details and in particular to identify whether it is a bachelor’s or a master’s degree that is needed. Clearly, having this additional information would have been a plus, as the consequences of over-education are probably most acute when only a bachelor's degree is required. Be that as it may, our results (available on request) show that in 80 to 86% of cases, depending on whether we consider our sample as a whole, the private or public sector, over-education can be described as mild, insofar as the PhD graduates actually do a job for which a tertiary degree is sufficient. Moreover, they suggest that the problem of over-education is somewhat less acute in the public sector than in the private sector. Indeed, while in the private sector over-education is severe or very severe for over 16% of over-educated PhDs, this is the case for less than 12% of over-educated PhDs in the public sector.16 The complete set of regression results, not reported here due to space constraints, is available on request.17 See Section 3.1 and Appendix Table A-2 for a detailed description of these characteristics.18 As a sensitivity test, we re-estimated our benchmark equation, including all covariates, separately for PhD holders working in the private sector (i.e. private companies and partnerships), the public sector (i.e. national, regional and local public organisations) and other organisations (i.e. not-for-profit trusts, charities, non-governmental organisations and other organisations) respectively. Our estimates, available on request, show that the wage penalty associated with over-education is greatest in the private sector (-23.2%), lower in the public sector (-16.2%) and not significant in other organisations. The lower penalty in the public sector is probably due to the fact that, in this this sector, wages are generally based on fairly precise job classifications, where seniority-based pay often continues to play an important role, with little or no scope for individual wage negotiation. Overall, this results in a relatively compressed wage distribution, where low-skilled workers tend to earn more than their private sector counterparts, while the reverse is true for high-skilled workers, and therefore also for PhD holders (Bargain and Melly Citation2008; Lucifora and Meurs Citation2006). In the private sector, on the other hand, salary dispersion is typically greater and highly qualified positions (which in some cases require a doctorate) are generally much better paid than in the public sector (Giordano et al. Citation2011). As the academic sector represents only a small proportion of total public employment, our results are not directly comparable with those of previous studies (e.g. Bender and Heywood Citation2009; Gaeta, Lavadera, and Pastore Citation2022) comparing wage penalties of over-educated PhD holders inside and outside academia.19 We also re-estimated our benchmark equation according to the severity of the over-education problem (e.g. qualified as mild, severe or very severe, see footnote 16 for the description of these categories). All sectors combined, our results (available on request) show that the wage penalty increases as the over-education problem worsens. The penalty is estimated at −24.9% and −34.5% in severe and very severe cases respectively. In mild cases, the penalty is not statistically significant. This non-significant outcome is likely to be at least partly driven by the fact that we are unable to distinguish PhD graduates in jobs requiring a bachelor’s degree from those in jobs requiring a master’s degree. Interestingly, though, if we turn to the estimates for the private sector, we find that the penalty is statistically significant and equal to −16.4% in mild cases and reaches −51.9% in more severe cases. In the public sector, the over-education wage penalty is estimated at −9.7 and −20.1% in mild and more severe cases respectively. However, none of these coefficients is statistically significant (again, probably because we can't distinguish between jobs requiring a bachelor’s or a master’s degree, but also because of a small sample issue, particularly for the more severe cases of over-education).20 The ORU (Over-, Required, and Under-education) approach, suggested by Duncan and Hoffman (Citation1981), enables to estimate the wage impact of over-education conditional on the level of education required to perform a job. The standard result from this literature is that over-educated workers earn a wage premium over their colleagues who do the same job but are adequately educated to do it (i.e. well-matched). In order to examine whether a similar result is obtained with our data, we re-estimated the over-education wage differential for doctoral graduates using an ORU approach. Our results, available on request, show that wages rise on average by 7.8% when the level of required education for a job increases by one year. Moreover, they indicate that a one-year increase in over-education among PhD holders improves wages by 3.9%. These estimates, as expected, suggest that over-educated PhD holders earn a wage premium over their well-matched colleagues. They are also in line with previous evidence showing that over-educated PhD holders can nevertheless take advantage of their degree to improve their career prospects (see e.g. Boman et al. (Citation2021)).21 See footnote 4.22 Detailed regression results, not reported here due to space constraints, are available on request.23 We thank an anonymous referee for making these valuable comments.
博士学历过高的工资惩罚:一个欧洲视角
摘要利用一个独特的泛欧数据集,我们依赖于四组协变量的两种替代度量和逐步控制,以便从理论模型的角度解释过度教育的工资惩罚。首先,在欧洲,似乎有相当一部分(即1/5到1/3)的博士确实是受了过多的教育。其次,这些真正受过高等教育的博士学位持有者,与那些学历相当的同行相比,面临着相当大的工资损失(从15%到近30%不等)。最后,无条件分位数回归强调,在博士学位持有者中,教育程度过高的工资惩罚在工资分布中大幅增加。关键词:博士毕业生,教育,技能,工作满意度,工资,欧洲,el代码:J21J24披露声明作者未报告潜在利益冲突。注1在欧盟,统计数据也指向了同样的方向:2013年至2018年,24至35岁的新入学博士生人数增加了近27%(从约7.1万人增加到近9万人),而2013年至2019年,博士生人数从约73.5万人增加到77.9万人(European Commission Citation2020;欧盟统计局,Citation2023)。此外,2019年,欧盟28国的新博士学位持有者数量约为12.1万人(Eurostat, Citation2023)这就是说,应该指出的是,相当多的人开始写论文的原因不是为了获得一份需要博士学位的工作。内在动机和智力发展也是重要的驱动因素(Hnatkova等)。Citation2022)。此外,研究表明,许多博士毕业生,尽管从事的工作并不需要博士学位(因此他们可能被过度教育),但仍然可以利用他们的学位来改善他们的职业前景。更具体地说,正如Boman等人(Citation2021)指出的那样,在许多工作中,博士学位,即使不是必需的,也是期望或重视的,因此拥有博士学位的人有一个更有趣和有价值的工作,这也使其更容易获得更多的责任,晋升或其他利益(金钱或其他)“自愿”一词应谨慎解释,因为它显然可能是一种受限制的选择Ermini, Papi和Scaturro的研究(Citation2017)基于四组意大利博士毕业生(涉及2004年,2006年,2008年和2010年),还发现博士毕业生在学术界和研究部门的工作往往与成功匹配有关。波曼等人(Citation2021)的分析基于对2006年至2020年9所欧洲大学博士毕业生的职业跟踪调查,得出的结论是,几乎一半的博士毕业生从事的工作不需要博士学位,但过度教育在大学和研究机构之外最为普遍依靠WA方法,过度教育是由关于博士有用性的问题的回答来构建的。在这方面,已经强调了在不同的研究中,确切的措辞是如何大不相同的:一些访谈涉及招聘标准(Duncan和Hoffman Citation1981),而另一些则涉及执行工作所需的教育(Hartog和Oosterbeek Citation1988)。证据还表明,同一个人对类似问题的反应不同,并且尚不清楚这些框架和措辞的差异是否以及在多大程度上导致了所需教育水平的差异(Green, Myerson, and Ostaszewski citation, 1999)。基于这些原因,我们以两种不同的方式来计算过度教育变量,即基于博士头衔对做的有用性和获得当前工作职位的有用性根据获得工作的教育水平计算的过度教育变量作为稳健性检验。基于这种替代度量的估计与基于工作所需的教育水平的估计非常相似。因此,后者仅用于逐步OLS分析(没有相互作用效应)。其他规格的结果证实了我们的发现,可应要求提供为了计算小时总工资,我们首先将变量Q50_X(即所分析的各个国家工人的“月总收入”)转换为一种共同货币,即欧元。为此,我们使用2014年各国货币与欧元之间的平均汇率。接下来,我们通过将“每周工作时数”(即变量Q10_2)乘以4.43来计算每月的工作时数(因为一般认为一个月平均包括4.33周)。最后,用月工资总额(以欧元表示)除以每月工作时间,我们就得到了小时工资总额。 此外,他们认为公共部门的过度教育问题在某种程度上没有私营部门那么严重。事实上,在私营部门,超过16%的受教育程度过高的博士受到严重或非常严重的教育,而在公共部门,受教育程度过高的博士只有不到12%的情况由于篇幅限制,这里没有报告完整的回归结果集,请根据要求提供这些特性的详细描述见3.1节和附录表a -2作为敏感性测试,我们分别对在私营部门(即私营公司和伙伴关系)、公共部门(即国家、地区和地方公共组织)和其他组织(即非营利信托基金、慈善机构、非政府组织和其他组织)工作的博士学位持有人重新估计了基准方程,包括所有协变量。我们的估计表明,与过度教育相关的工资惩罚在私营部门最大(-23.2%),在公共部门较低(-16.2%),在其他组织中并不显著。公共部门的惩罚较低,可能是因为在这一部门,工资一般以相当精确的工作分类为基础,其中以资历为基础的工资往往继续发挥重要作用,很少或根本没有个人工资谈判的余地。总体而言,这导致了相对压缩的工资分配,其中低技能工人往往比私营部门的同行赚得更多,而高技能工人的情况正好相反,因此也适用于博士学位(Bargain和melanie Citation2008;Lucifora and Meurs Citation2006)。另一方面,在私营部门,工资差距通常更大,高资质职位(在某些情况下需要博士学位)的薪酬通常比公共部门高得多(佐丹奴等人)。Citation2011)。由于学术部门只占总公共就业的一小部分,我们的结果不能与以前的研究直接比较(例如Bender和Heywood Citation2009;Gaeta, Lavadera和Pastore Citation2022)比较了学术界内外受过高等教育的博士学位持有人的工资处罚我们还根据过度教育问题的严重程度重新估计了我们的基准方程(例如,合格的轻度,严重或非常严重,见脚注16这些类别的描述)。综合所有部门,我们的结果(可要求提供)表明,随着过度教育问题的恶化,工资惩罚也在增加。在严重和非常严重的情况下,罚款估计分别为- 24.9%和- 34.5%。在轻微的情况下,处罚在统计上并不显著。这种不显著的结果可能至少部分是由于我们无法区分需要学士学位的工作中的博士毕业生和需要硕士学位的工作中的博士毕业生。然而,有趣的是,如果我们转向对私营部门的估计,我们发现在统计上是显著的,在轻微的情况下等于- 16.4%,在更严重的情况下达到- 51.9%。在公共部门,在轻度和更严重的情况下,过度教育的工资惩罚估计分别为- 9.7%和- 20.1%。然而,这些系数在统计上都不显著(再次,可能是因为我们无法区分需要学士学位还是硕士学位的工作,但也因为小样本问题,特别是对于更严重的过度教育的情况)邓肯和霍夫曼(Citation1981)提出的ORU(教育过度、教育要求和教育不足)方法,能够估计受教育程度过高对工资的影响,这种影响取决于工作所需的教育水平。从这些文献中得出的标准结论是,受教育程度过高的工人比从事同样工作但受教育程度足够的同事(即匹配良好的同事)挣得更高的工资。为了检验我们的数据是否获得了类似的结果,我们使用ORU方法重新估计了博士毕业生过度教育的工资差异。我们的研究结果显示,一份工作所需的教育水平每提高一年,工资就会平均上涨7.8%。此外,他们还指出,博士学历每增加一年,工资就会提高3.9%。正如预期的那样,这些估计表明,受教育程度过高的博士学位持有者比他们的同事挣得更多。他们也与之前的证据一致,这些证据表明,受教育程度过高的博士学位持有者仍然可以利用他们的学位来改善他们的职业前景(参见Boman等人(Citation2021))见脚注4.22详细的回归结果,由于篇幅限制,此处未作报告,可根据要求查阅我们感谢一位匿名的推荐人提出这些有价值的意见。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Education Economics
Education Economics EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH-
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
8.30%
发文量
38
期刊介绍: Education Economics is a peer-reviewed journal serving as a forum for debate in all areas of the economics and management of education. Particular emphasis is given to the "quantitative" aspects of educational management which involve numerate disciplines such as economics and operational research. The content is of international appeal and is not limited to material of a technical nature. Applied work with clear policy implications is especially encouraged. Readership of the journal includes academics in the field of education, economics and management; civil servants and local government officials responsible for education and manpower planning; educational managers at the level of the individual school or college.
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