Michael Bennon, Daniel De La Hormaza, R. Richard Geddes
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
Abstract The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1970 requires federal agencies to assess the environmental impact of proposed federal actions. NEPA thus affects delivery of a wide range of infrastructure projects. NEPA requires the completion of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for environmentally impactful federal actions. For infrastructure projects this can entail significant delays. A typical EIS now takes about four and one-half years and is over 600 pages long. Some EIS’s take over a decade to complete. We provide the first detailed analysis of project approval times under NEPA by examining 1269 EIS permitting processes. We analyze empirically the well-defined interval from Notice of Intent to file to Record of Decision (ROD). We use a Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the impact of several factors on EIS duration. Factors include permits featuring major construction, those including private investment, those for projects located in states with restrictive environmental laws, those using the federal permitting “dashboard,” and those publishing a Supplemental EIS prior to the ROD. We find that privately financed projects receive faster permitting, while projects involving major construction, those undertaken in restrictive states, and those utilizing the federal permitting dashboard, face slower permitting times. We also explore links between EIS page counts and permitting time. Greater EIS page counts are associated with longer permitting times. We conclude by examining EIS completion during economic stimulus programs such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), as well as the frequency of EIS completion by the federal government.
期刊介绍:
Recent legislative and policy reforms have changed the nature of regulation. Partial deregulation has created a new dimension to regulatory problems, as the debate is extended to include diversification and new forms of regulation. The introduction of incentive-based rate schedules and ratemaking procedures, the integration of demand-side programs with planning for capitol expansion, and other developments, raise a host of theoretical and empirical questions. The Journal of Regulatory Economics serves as a high quality forum for the analysis of regulatory theories and institutions by developing the rigorous economics foundations of regulation. Both theoretical and applied works, including experimental research, are encouraged. Research in all aspects of regulation is of interest including traditional problems of natural monopoly, antitrust and competition policy, incentive regulation, deregulation, auction theory, new policy instruments, health and safety regulation, environmental regulation, insurance and financial regulation, hazardous and solid waste regulation, universal service obligation, and consumer product regulation. The JRE provides researchers, policy-makers, and institutions with current perspectives on the theory and practice of economics of regulation. While there are a number of journals and magazines that include the study of regulation, the JRE is unique in that it fills a gap in the market for a high quality journal dealing solely with the economics of regulation.Officially cited as: J Regul Econ