Better than nothing: On defining the valence of a life

IF 1.2 2区哲学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Economics and Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-11-07 DOI:10.1017/s0266267123000305

Campbell Brown

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract The valence of a life – that is, whether it is good, bad or neutral – is an important consideration in population ethics. This paper examines various definitions of valence. The main focus is ‘temporal’ definitions, which define valence in terms of the ‘shape’ of a life’s value over time. The paper argues that temporal definitions are viable only with a restricted domain, and therefore are incompatible with certain substantive theories of well-being. It also briefly considers some popular non-temporal definitions, and raises some problems for these.

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聊胜于无:关于生命价值的定义

生命的价值，即生命是好、是坏、是中性，是人口伦理学的一个重要考量。本文考察了价的各种定义。主要焦点是“时间”定义，即根据生命价值随时间的“形状”来定义价值。本文认为，时间定义仅在有限的领域是可行的，因此与某些实质性的幸福理论是不相容的。它还简要地考虑了一些流行的非时态定义，并提出了一些问题。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Economics and Philosophy Multiple-

CiteScore

1.80

自引率

8.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The disciplines of economics and philosophy each possess their own special analytical methods, whose combination is powerful and fruitful. Each discipline can be enriched by the other. Economics and Philosophy aims to promote their mutual enrichment by publishing articles and book reviews in all areas linking these subjects. Topics include the methodology and epistemology of economics, the foundations of decision theory and game theory, the nature of rational choice in general, historical work on economics with a philosophical purpose, ethical issues in economics, the use of economic techniques in ethical theory, and many other subjects.