The New Form Agency Problem: Cooperation and Circular Agency

IF 1.1 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

B E Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy Pub Date : 2023-11-07 DOI:10.1515/bejeap-2022-0188

Chun-Hung Chen, Kuan-Wei Chen, Yu-Fan Chen, Chia-Yin Lin

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract This study explores cooperation in the circular agency problem. In circular agency, an agent has weak power in the face of its principal. This research explores a cooperation mechanism in which three participants simultaneously have the identity of principal and agent, in order to illuminate the power struggle between the board of directors, the external shareholder, and the manager of a company. We use the equilibrium results to explain the phenomenon of cooperation between members of the enterprise in practice. Our results have implications for firm governance.

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新形式代理问题:合作与循环代理

摘要本研究探讨循环代理问题中的合作问题。在循环代理中，代理人在其委托人面前具有较弱的权力。本研究探讨了三方同时具有委托和代理身份的合作机制，以阐明公司董事会、外部股东和经理之间的权力斗争。我们用均衡结果来解释实践中企业成员之间的合作现象。我们的研究结果对公司治理具有启示意义。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

B E Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.50

自引率

11.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy welcomes submissions that employ microeconomics to analyze issues in business, consumer behavior, and public policy. We aim to be an international forum for scholarship, whether the scholarship considers an issue that is general or that pertains to a particular country or region, but authors should bear in mind that our readers come from around the world. Potential issues of interest include: the interaction of firms, the functioning of markets, the effects of domestic and international policy, and the design of organizations and institutions.