Phronesis, meta-emotions, and character education

Abstract

Despite the recent interest in phronesis (practical wisdom), and the creation of a four-componential model to unpack its nature, various puzzles (philosophical, psychological, and educational) remain about those components, not least the proposed one of emotion regulation. This paper introduces four remaining puzzles about this component and provides a brief overview of possible responses, based on Aristotle’s texts. However, given Aristotle’s own naturalistic method, in which ethical theorising must be constantly updated in light of empirical findings, the paper suggests that Aristotle’s texts only take us thus far and that we need to draw on contemporary psychological sources for further enlightenment. The paper therefore invokes research from the last quarter of a century about so-called meta-emotions. This research is relevant given the meta-status of phronesis as an integrative virtue. Some of the possible implications of this research for an understanding of the emotional component of phronesis are elicited, as well as how it can be cultivated as part of character education.