Does Discipline Decrease Police Misconduct? Evidence from Chicago Civilian Allegations

IF 5.5 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Kyle Rozema, Max Schanzenbach
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Reformers are calling for greater oversight of police behavior, in part through enhanced use of civilian complaints. However, others counter that greater oversight could chill effective policing. We assess police officer response to administrative determinations of misconduct. Using Chicago data, we find strong evidence that a sustained allegation reduces that officer’s future misconduct. We find no evidence that this effect is driven by incapacitation, such as assignment to desk duty, or by officer disengagement. We conclude that our findings are most consistent with improved officer conduct, in part from oversight and officer concerns over promotion, salary, and desirable assignments. (JEL H76, J45, K42, M54)
纪律能减少警察的不当行为吗?芝加哥平民指控的证据
改革派呼吁加强对警察行为的监督,部分是通过更多地利用平民投诉。然而,其他人反驳说,更大的监管可能会削弱有效的警务。我们评估警察对不当行为的行政决定的反应。利用芝加哥的数据,我们发现强有力的证据表明,持续的指控减少了该警官未来的不当行为。我们没有发现证据表明这种影响是由丧失行为能力造成的,比如被分配到办公室工作,或者是由于军官脱离接触。我们的结论是,我们的研究结果与改进的军官行为最一致,部分原因是监督和军官对晋升、工资和理想任务的关注。(凝胶h76, j45, k42, m54)
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来源期刊
CiteScore
9.10
自引率
1.60%
发文量
63
期刊介绍: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics publishes papers covering a range of topics in applied economics, with a focus on empirical microeconomic issues. In particular, we welcome papers on labor economics, development microeconomics, health, education, demography, empirical corporate finance, empirical studies of trade, and empirical behavioral economics.
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