What Is It like to Have a Gender Identity?

IF 1.8 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
MIND Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI:10.1093/mind/fzac071
Florence Ashley
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract By attending to how people speak about their gender, we can find diverse answers to the question of what it is like to have a gender identity. To some, it is little more than having a body whereas others may report it as more attitudinal or dispositional—seemingly contradictory views. In this paper, I seek to reconcile these disparate answers by developing a theory of how individual gender identity comes about. In the simplest possible terms, I propose that gender identity is how we make sense of our gender subjectivity, the totality of our gendered experiences of ourselves. Gender identity is constituted by gender subjectivity, but this constitutive relationship is underdetermined. While gender subjectivity may narrow the range of inhabitable gender identities, it is always compatible with more than one. To arrive at a gender identity, we arrange gender subjectivity like building materials. My theory helps us understand how different people offer seemingly incompatible accounts of their gender identity without questioning their authenticity or validity. They simply arrange similar building materials differently.
拥有性别认同是什么感觉?
通过关注人们如何谈论自己的性别,我们可以找到关于性别认同是什么样的问题的不同答案。对一些人来说,它只不过是拥有一个身体,而另一些人可能认为它更像是态度或性格——似乎是相互矛盾的观点。在本文中,我试图通过发展个体性别认同如何产生的理论来调和这些不同的答案。用最简单的术语来说,我认为性别认同是我们如何理解我们的性别主体性,我们对自己的性别体验的总体。性别认同是由性别主体性构成的,但这种构成关系是不确定的。虽然性别主体性可能会缩小可居住的性别身份的范围,但它总是与不止一种性别身份兼容。为了达到性别认同,我们把性别主体性像建筑材料一样排列起来。我的理论帮助我们理解不同的人如何在不质疑其真实性或有效性的情况下,提供看似不相容的性别认同描述。他们只是以不同的方式排列类似的建筑材料。
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来源期刊
MIND
MIND PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
3.10
自引率
5.60%
发文量
47
期刊介绍: Mind has long been a leading journal in philosophy. For well over 100 years it has presented the best of cutting edge thought from epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. Mind continues its tradition of excellence today. Mind has always enjoyed a strong reputation for the high standards established by its editors and receives around 350 submissions each year. The editor seeks advice from a large number of expert referees, including members of the network of Associate Editors and his international advisers. Mind is published quarterly.
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