Fair equality of chances for prediction-based decisions

IF 1.2 2区哲学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Economics and Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-11-09 DOI:10.1017/s0266267123000342

Michele Loi, Anders Herlitz, Hoda Heidari

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract This article presents a fairness principle for evaluating decision-making based on predictions: a decision rule is unfair when the individuals directly impacted by the decisions who are equal with respect to the features that justify inequalities in outcomes do not have the same statistical prospects of being benefited or harmed by them, irrespective of their socially salient morally arbitrary traits. The principle can be used to evaluate prediction-based decision-making from the point of view of a wide range of antecedently specified substantive views about justice in outcome distributions.

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基于预测的决策的公平机会均等

摘要本文提出了一个基于预测评估决策的公平原则:当直接受到决策影响的个人，在证明结果不平等的特征方面是平等的，而在统计上却没有相同的从中受益或受到伤害的前景时，无论他们的社会显著的道德武断特征如何，决策规则是不公平的。该原则可用于评估基于预测的决策，从广泛的事先指定的关于结果分配正义的实质性观点的角度来看。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Economics and Philosophy Multiple-

CiteScore

1.80

自引率

8.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The disciplines of economics and philosophy each possess their own special analytical methods, whose combination is powerful and fruitful. Each discipline can be enriched by the other. Economics and Philosophy aims to promote their mutual enrichment by publishing articles and book reviews in all areas linking these subjects. Topics include the methodology and epistemology of economics, the foundations of decision theory and game theory, the nature of rational choice in general, historical work on economics with a philosophical purpose, ethical issues in economics, the use of economic techniques in ethical theory, and many other subjects.