Dishonesty as a collective-risk social dilemma

IF 16.4 1区 化学 Q1 CHEMISTRY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY
Shuguang Jiang, Marie Claire Villeval
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We investigated lying as a collective-risk social dilemma. Misreporting resulted in increased individual earnings but when total claims reached a certain threshold, all group members were at risk of collective sanction, regardless of their individual behavior. Due to selfishness and miscoordination, most individuals earned less than the reservation payoff from honest reporting in the group. However, preferences for truth-telling lowered the risk of collective sanction in this setting compared to a social dilemma game in which players could make direct claims without lying. The risk of sanctions decreased with risk aversion and a smaller group size.

Abstract Image

作为集体风险社会困境的不诚实行为
我们将撒谎作为一种集体风险社会困境进行了研究。误报会导致个人收入增加,但当索赔总额达到一定临界值时,无论个人行为如何,所有小组成员都有可能受到集体制裁。由于自私和协调不当,大多数人在小组中诚实报告的收益低于保留报酬。然而,与社会两难博弈中的参与者可以不说谎而直接提出要求相比,在这种情况下,说真话的偏好降低了集体制裁的风险。制裁的风险随着风险规避和群体规模的缩小而降低。
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来源期刊
Accounts of Chemical Research
Accounts of Chemical Research 化学-化学综合
CiteScore
31.40
自引率
1.10%
发文量
312
审稿时长
2 months
期刊介绍: Accounts of Chemical Research presents short, concise and critical articles offering easy-to-read overviews of basic research and applications in all areas of chemistry and biochemistry. These short reviews focus on research from the author’s own laboratory and are designed to teach the reader about a research project. In addition, Accounts of Chemical Research publishes commentaries that give an informed opinion on a current research problem. Special Issues online are devoted to a single topic of unusual activity and significance. Accounts of Chemical Research replaces the traditional article abstract with an article "Conspectus." These entries synopsize the research affording the reader a closer look at the content and significance of an article. Through this provision of a more detailed description of the article contents, the Conspectus enhances the article's discoverability by search engines and the exposure for the research.
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