FACTOR OF THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION IN GERMANY IN SOVIET-POLISH RELATIONS IN 1923

IF 0.1 Q3 HISTORY
S. A. Sklyarov
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Abstract

The article raises the little-studied topic of the influence of the proletarian revolution in Germany, prepared in 1923 with the active support of the Comintern and the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), on relations between Poland and the USSR. The author relies on unpublished archival materials, first published and introduced into scientific circulation, revealing these events in a new light, declassified in the post-Soviet period. The work shows how, despite the presence of radical proposals that threatened a new large-scale war in Europe, the leadership of the RCP(b) chose a more pragmatic approach. Given the military power of the Polish state, Moscow decided to dispense with threats and intimidation that distinguished the Soviet approach to Poland from its policies towards Lithuania and Latvia in order to achieve the lifting of Warsaw's severe restrictions on transit between Germany and the USSR. In response, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) agreed to make a number of concessions, primarily on economic and financial issues, including the payment of 30 million rubles in gold to Poland, to which Warsaw was entitled under the Riga Peace Treaty and was actually sabotaged by Moscow. In addition, the USSR was ready to allow the transit of Polish goods to Persia. This plan did not work, since Poland was aware that the lifting of restrictions on transit between the USSR and Germany increased the chances of revolution in Germany, which threatened Poland with communist countries encircling it. In addition, by the time the Soviet mission arrived in Warsaw with the above-mentioned proposals, there was no longer much sense in insisting on such an exchange with strong opposition from Polish diplomats, since plans to organize a proletarian revolution in Germany had failed.
1923年苏波关系中德国共产主义革命的因素
这篇文章提出了一个很少被研究的话题,即1923年在共产国际和俄国共产党(布尔什维克)的积极支持下准备的德国无产阶级革命对波兰和苏联关系的影响。作者依靠未发表的档案材料,首次发表并引入科学流通,以新的视角揭示了这些事件,在后苏联时期解密。这项工作表明,尽管存在威胁在欧洲爆发新的大规模战争的激进建议,但RCP(b)的领导层选择了一种更务实的方法。鉴于波兰国家的军事力量,莫斯科决定放弃威胁和恐吓,以实现华沙对德国和苏联之间过境的严格限制。苏联对波兰的政策不同于对立陶宛和拉脱维亚的政策。作为回应,苏共中央政治局同意作出若干让步,主要是在经济和财政问题上,包括向波兰支付价值3000万卢布的黄金。根据《里加和平条约》,华沙有权获得黄金,但实际上受到莫斯科的破坏。此外,苏联准备允许波兰货物过境到波斯。这个计划没有成功,因为波兰意识到,取消苏联和德国之间的过境限制增加了德国发生革命的可能性,这对波兰构成了共产主义国家包围的威胁。此外,当苏联代表团带着上述建议抵达华沙时,由于在德国组织无产阶级革命的计划失败了,在波兰外交官的强烈反对下,坚持进行这种交换已经没有多大意义了。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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CiteScore
0.20
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35
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