The Illusion of Insight in an Extended Auditor's Report

M. Pakaluk
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Abstract

KPMG's discussion of Bribery and Corruption as a Key Audit Matter (KAM) in the Extended Auditor's Reports (EAR) of Rolls-Royce for 2013-2015 is examined as implying limitations on EARs in general. The KAM for Bribery and Corruption was apparently written in view of the company's legal interests rather than from the point of view of what an investor would want to know from a truly independent representative with that kind of privileged access. The Financial Reporting Council has stated that the two purposes of EARs are (i) to inform investors and (ii) to give them greater confidence in the audit. However, (i) the Bribery and Corruption KAM failed significantly to inform investors, while yet, troublingly, giving the impression of informing them. Moreover, (ii) it encouraged a misplaced confidence, in view of the roughly $1 billion in fines and clawbacks in the (generous, highly mitigated) Rolls-Royce Deferred Prosecution Agreements of January 2017.
扩展审计报告中的洞察力错觉
毕马威在2013-2015年劳斯莱斯扩展审计报告(EAR)中对贿赂和腐败作为关键审计事项(KAM)的讨论被视为暗示EAR的一般限制。显然,《贿赂与腐败调查表》是考虑到公司的法律利益而编写的,而不是考虑到投资者希望从拥有这种特权的真正独立代表那里了解到什么。财务报告委员会表示,审计报告的两个目的是(i)告知投资者,(ii)增强他们对审计的信心。然而,(i)贿赂和腐败KAM明显未能通知投资者,但令人不安的是,给人的印象是通知了他们。此外,(ii)鉴于2017年1月罗尔斯·罗伊斯(Rolls-Royce)达成的(慷慨且高度减轻的)延期起诉协议(Deferred Prosecution agreement)中约有10亿美元的罚款和回扣,它助长了一种错位的信心。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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