There is No 'I' in Team: Career Concerns, Risk-taking Incentives and Team Outcomes

P. Ngo, Steven Roberts
{"title":"There is No 'I' in Team: Career Concerns, Risk-taking Incentives and Team Outcomes","authors":"P. Ngo, Steven Roberts","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2514802","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"National Basketball Association (NBA) contracting rules provide plausibly exogenous variation in career concerns near contract end. We use this setting to study how individual career concerns affect risk-taking behavior and can sabotage team performance. Using the frequency and duration of player injuriesfrom 1991 to 2013 we measure individual risk-taking behavior.We find that the average player’s likelihood of missing a game due to injury falls by 0.06 percentage points (or over 100% relative to the mean injury rate) in the final three months of his contract, and when missing games due to injury is unavoidable, his recovery time drops by 22 days. However, “elite” players with virtually no career concerns actually miss more games due to injury. Finally, we find that elite players missing too many games and “average” players playing before healthy, combine to hurt team performance. For each additional player in the last three months on contract, the win probability for that team falls by over 2.6%.","PeriodicalId":105736,"journal":{"name":"Organizations & Markets: Policies & Processes eJournal","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Organizations & Markets: Policies & Processes eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2514802","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

Abstract

National Basketball Association (NBA) contracting rules provide plausibly exogenous variation in career concerns near contract end. We use this setting to study how individual career concerns affect risk-taking behavior and can sabotage team performance. Using the frequency and duration of player injuriesfrom 1991 to 2013 we measure individual risk-taking behavior.We find that the average player’s likelihood of missing a game due to injury falls by 0.06 percentage points (or over 100% relative to the mean injury rate) in the final three months of his contract, and when missing games due to injury is unavoidable, his recovery time drops by 22 days. However, “elite” players with virtually no career concerns actually miss more games due to injury. Finally, we find that elite players missing too many games and “average” players playing before healthy, combine to hurt team performance. For each additional player in the last three months on contract, the win probability for that team falls by over 2.6%.
团队中没有“我”:职业关注、冒险激励和团队成果
美国国家篮球协会(NBA)的合同规则在合同结束时提供了看似合理的职业生涯外生变化。我们使用这一设置来研究个人职业关注如何影响冒险行为并破坏团队绩效。利用1991 - 2013年球员受伤的频率和持续时间来衡量个体的冒险行为。我们发现,在合同的最后三个月,平均球员因伤缺阵的可能性下降了0.06个百分点(或相对于平均伤病率超过100%),当因伤缺阵不可避免时,他的恢复时间减少了22天。然而,几乎没有职业生涯问题的“精英”球员实际上因伤缺席了更多的比赛。最后,我们发现精英球员缺席过多的比赛和“普通”球员在健康之前参加比赛,共同影响了球队的表现。在过去三个月的合同中,每增加一名球员,球队的胜率就会下降2.6%以上。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信